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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
The law of contempt is one aspect of the court's inherent 
jurisdiction(l) and has developed through the centuries. It 
is difficult to define precisely but that of Oswald's has not 
been bettered:-
"To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be 
constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority 
and administration of the law into disrepute or disregard 
or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their 
witnesses during the litigation." 
( 2) 
The law of contempt is designed to ensure the effective 
administration of justice in both civil and criminal 
proceedings. (3 ) It is a means by which the courts may act to:-
" ..• prevent or punish conduct which tends to obstruct, 
prejudice or abuse the administration of justice either in 
relation to a particular case or generally." 
( 4) 
While this paper is concerned mainly with the procedural 
aspects of contempt of court, it is thought best to mention 
some of its basic classifications. ( 5) 
(1) see Part II A 
(2) Oswald: Contempt of Court (3rd Ed.) 1910, p.6 
(3) Johnson v Grant (1923) S.C. 789, 790 per Lord President Clyde; 
Morris v The Crown Office (1970) 2 Q.B. 114; 122, per 
Denning M.R.; 129, per Salmond L.J. 
(4) Report of the Committee on Contempt of Court (hereinafter 
referred to as 'the Phillimore Report) Cmnd. 5794 (December 
19 7 4 ) Par a . 1 
(5) For a detailed analysis of the law see Halsbury's Laws of 
England (4th Ed.) Volume 9 under the heading of Contempt of 
Court (paras. 1 - 200) 
IJDb1a Unrverslty crt 
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The subject matter is traditionally divided up into civil 
and criminal contempts. Criminal contempts include conduct 
which may interfere with the course of justice through 
prejudicial publication of comment on civil and criminal trials, 
assault or abuse of a judge or officers of the court, refusal 
of a witness to answer a proper question or attend court, 
libelling the court or it's officers (scandalising the court), 
interfering with witnesses or jurors during or after a trial 
and misbehaviour of it's officers (including solicitors). (l) 
Civil contempts consist of wilful disobedience to judgments, 
orders and other processes of the court, such as breach of 
injunction or aiding and abetting the breach of an injunction, 
breach of an undertaking, disobeying an order to pay money into 
court or failure to comply with an order for interrogatories 
d . ( 2 ) h' 1· d t b h . or 1scovery. T is 1st oes no purport to e compre ens1ve 
but merely to indicate the scope of the law of contempt. 
The law of civil and criminal contempt are both concerned 
with upholding the due administration of justice. (3 ) Civil 
contempt is foremost a wrong to the party in litigation who 
seeks to enforce an order, but there is also a penal element 
in the court's jurisdiction. If the court lacked the means of 
enforcing orders and judgments, the litigant would not be the 
only one to suffer. The whole administration of justice would 
be brought into disrepute. (4 ) 
There is another classification that needs to be mentioned. 
Contempts are divided into contempts committed in the face of 
the court (e.g. assaults on judges, interference with jurors, 
etc.) and those committed outside the court. The latter 
(1) see Justice Report: Contempt of Court, (1959) p.5 
(2) cf. Rules 165 - 167 Code of Civil Procedure 
(3) G.J. Borrie and N.V. Lowe: The Law of Contempt, Butterworths 
(1973); hereinafter referred to as 'Borrie & Lowe'. 
(4) idem 
includes conduct liable to interfere with the course of 
justice in particular proceedings, such as prejudicial 
publication in newspapers and 'scandalising the court' 
by, for instance, questioning the impartiality of a judge or 
the court as a whole. (l) 
The movement to reform the law of contempt has gathered 
momentum in England over the past fifteen years. In 1959 
the Justice Organisation published its Report on Contempt of 
Court. Some of its recommendations were incorporated in the 
Administration of Justice Act, 1960 (U.K.) which created a 
right of appeal in criminal contempt cases and provided certain 
statutory defences for journalists. Then in 1969, the Committee 
on the Law of Contempt as it affects Tribunals of Inquiry 
( 2) 
reported. 
the Report of 
Finally, and most significantly, in December 1974 
the Committee on Contempt of Court (the 
Phillimore Committee) was published. 
( 3) 
This Committee made 
wide ranging recommendations as to reform and some of the 
committee's suggested reforms of procedure will be mentioned 
in this paper. 
In New Zealand, the Attorney-General, Dr. Finlay, has 
suggested that the special committee set up to look at the law 
of libel may also investigate the law of contempt. 
( 1) 'Borrie & Lowe' Chapter 6, p. 152 ff. 
(2) 'The Salmond Committee Report' (1969) Crnnd. 4078 
( 3 ) Crnnd . 5 7 9 4 
PART II 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS 
IN RELATION TO THE PUNISHMENT OF CONTEMPT 
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
Contempts have always been punishable in the inherent 
jurisdiction of the Superior Courts of Record in England. 
This is only one aspect of the general inherent power of the 
Superior Courts to regulate their practice, and to prevent 
abuse of process and to exercise a supervisory control over 
proceedings. The inherent jurisdiction of the court is said 
to arise from the very nature of the court as a Superior 
(1) Court of Law. The character of such a court involves of 
necessity that it should be endowed with a power to maintain 
its authority and to ensure that its process is not abused 
h . d" . d . d" d (2 ) or tat its procee ings are not interrupte or preJU ice. 
The inherent power is exercisable even in matters regulated 
by statute. Lord Morris in Connelly v D.P.P. ( 3 ) said in 
relation to the Court's inherent power to regulate abuse of 
process:-
"There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed 
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are 
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such 
jurisdiction. I would regard them as powers which are 
inherent within such jurisdiction. A court must enjoy 
such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice 
and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat 
(1) Master Jacob "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" 
Current Legal Problems (1970) p. 27 
(2) ibid 27 
(3) (1964) A.C. 1254 
any attempted thwarting of its process." 
(1) 
In New Zealand, the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1841 (
2 ) 
gave an ample general jurisdiction to the Supreme Court by 
reference to the Superior Courts at Westminster. This 
provision was repeated in the 1844 Supreme Court Ordinance. (
3 ) 
This in turn was replaced by the Supreme Court Act of 1860. (
4 ) 
Section 4 of this Act gave the New Zealand Supreme Court the 
full jurisdiction which the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common 
Pleas and Exchequer had in England at the time of the passing 
of the Act. Section 5 conferred the equitable and common law 
jurisdiction which the Lord High Chancellor, the Court of 
Chancery and other Superior Courts of Equity had in England 
and the Lord High Chancellor's jurisdiction over infants. 
Section 6 dealt with the special jurisdiction of granting and 
revoking probate of wills and letters of administration. 
Section 16 of the Supreme Court Act 1882 continued that 
jurisdiction and conferred upon the Supreme Court all judicial 
jurisdiction which may be necessary to administer the laws of 
New Zealand. This section is identical to section 16 of the 
Judicature Act 1908. 
The New Zealand Supreme Court consequently has the 
jurisdiction of a Superior Court of Record and because of its 
nature as such, it must be taken to have an ample jurisdiction 
to regulate its process and punish contempt. In the recent case 
of the Attorney-General v Taylor & Edwards (






"Therefore, on the topic of the inherent jurisdiction which 
arises from the nature of this Court as a Superior Court 
(1964) A.C. 1254, 1301 
4 Viet. Session II No. 1 
7 Viet. Session III No. 1 
24 Viet. No 17 
(1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138 
of Record, I say the origin, purpose and justification 
of the Courts to punish contempt is the prevention of 
interference with the administration of justice. Any 
act done which is calculated to lower the authority of 
( 1) 
the court is a contempt." 
The Court of Appeal in Taylor v Attorney-General (
2 ) 
also discussed the nature of the inherent jurisdiction. 
Wild C.J. (3 ) mentioned the clear acceptance by all parties 
that Beattie J. had acted in the exercise of the inherent 
jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its judicial process. 
He cited a passage from the judgment of Menzies J. in 
Re Forbes ex parte Bevan. (
4 ) This passage is as follows:-
"Inherent jurisdiction is the power which a court has 
simply because it is a court of a particular description. 
Thus, the Courts of Common Law without the aid of any 
authorising provision had inherent jurisdiction to 
prevent abuse of their process and punish for contempt 
Wild C.J., after quoting from the passage in the judgment 
of Lord Morris in Connelly v D.P.P., (
6 ) already cited, 
concluded:-
"In New Zealand the Supreme Court is established as a 
High Court of Justice for the administration of justice 
throughout the country (s.3 Judicature Act 1908) and it 
has that inherent jurisdiction." 
( 7) 
Richmond J. distinguished the primary jurisdiction of the 
court which is the authority of the court to decide matters 
( 1) ibid 147 
( 2) Unreported judgment 11th July 1975 CA 28/75 
( 3) p. 6 of his unreported judgment 
( 4) (1972) 46 A.L.J.R. 401 
( 5) ibid 403 
( 6) (1964) A. C. 1254, 1301 
( 7) p. 6 of the unreported judgment 
11 ( 5) 
litigated before it or to take cognisance of matters presented 
for decision and the "inherent jurisdiction'' which is the exercise 
of powers ancillary to the exercise of their jurisdiction in 
the primary sense:-
"Many such ancillary powers are conferred by statute or by 
rules of court but in so far as they are not so conferred 
then they can only exist because they are necessary to 
enable the courts to act effectively within their 
jurisdiction in the primary sense." 
( 1) 
Woodhouse J. dissented in the result but made similar 
remarks to the above. He pointed out that the inherent 
jurisdiction arises to give support to the functioning of the 
court as a court of justice and as such, is part not of the 
substantive but of procedural law. He went on:-
" .•. it is exercisable for the purpose of controlling not 
only the actions of persons associated with the proceedings 
but the world at large. That sort of judicial power 
obviously could not be used for purposes of individual or 
group convenience nor even for the public interest in 
general." ( 2 ) 
He returned to the same point in a later passage:-
"Thus it is the due administration of justice - at the time 
and for the future - that is the concern and province of 
the court: not the personal but extraneous problem that may 
face the individual litigant or witness or judge in some 
particular case." ( 3 ) 
(1) p. 4 of Richmond J. 's unreported judgrnent 
(2) p. 2 of Woodhouse J.'s unreported judgment 
(3) ibid 
There are other sources of contempt jurisdiction in New 
Zealand other than the inherent jurisdiction mentioned above. 
As the Supreme Court was conferred with all the jurisdiction 
of the Superior Courts of Westminster, it can be argued that 
a contempt jurisdiction was included. The existence of this 
'statutory' jurisdiction was accepted by three members of the 
Full Court of the Supreme Court in Attorney-General v Blomfield. (l) 
It is interesting to note that only one judge in this case 
referred specifically to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. (
2 ) 
Two others did not deal with the point. (3 ) In the later case 
of Nash v Nash in re Cobb ( 4 ) Salmond J. in delivering the 
judgment of the Full Court clearly based his judgment upon 
the assumption that the jurisdiction was inherent. (
5 ) There 
is yet another possible source of contempt jurisdiction. 
By section 16 of the Judicature Act 1908, the Supreme Court 
has conferred on it all judicial jurisdiction which may be 
necessary to administer the laws of New Zealand. (6 ) Contempt 
powers are designed to uphold and ensure the effective 
administration of justice. (7 ) 
With the enactment of a Criminal Code in 1893 which excluded 
common law offences and with the intervention of the legislature 
into the field of contempt of court, difficult problems as to the 
relationship of the courts' inherent powers to the statutory 
provisions have arisen. In this section it is proposed firstly 
to discuss the relationship of criminal contempt to the general 
criminal law of New Zealand. Then other specific statutory 
provisions dealing with contempts will be mentioned. 
(1) (1913) 33 N.Z.L.R. 545, 555 per Stout C.J.; 579 per Cooper J.; 
584 per Sim J. 
(2) Denniston J. 
(3) Chapman J. and Williams J. 
(4) (1924) N.Z.L.R. 495 
(5) ibid 496, 498 
(6) Richmond J. in his judgrnent in Taylor v Attorney-General 
recognised that s. 16 of the Judicature Act gives rise to 
a contempt jurisdiction. 
(7) Barrie & Lowe 
1) CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
GENERAL CRIMINAL LAW OF NEW ZEALAND 
Section 9 of the Crimes Act 1961 now governs the situation. 
It provides:-
'No-one shall be convicted of any offence at Common Law, or 
of any offence against any Act of the Parliament of England 
or the Parliament of Great Britain or the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom: 
Provided that:-
(a) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the 
power or authority of the House of Representatives or 
of any court to punish for contempt ... " 
This section varies considerably from the equivalent section 
of the 1908 Crimes Act (section 5) which caused difficulties in 
interpretation. Section 5 provided that:-
'Every person who is a party to an offence must be proceeded 
against under some provision of this Act or some other 
enactment which is not inconsistent here with and not repealed, 
and shall not be proceeded against at Common Law. 
In A.G. v Blomfield (l) it was argued that section 5 superceded 
and abolished the jurisdiction of the court to deal summarily with 
criminal contempts and that these had to be dealt with by 
. d' t d 'f' . . f h C . ( 2 ) in ic ment un er some speci ic provision o t e rimes Act. 
This broad proposition was rejected by the Full Court as they found 
that the power to commit for criminal contempt was recognised in 
other enactments and, therefore, could not be regarded as having 
(1) (1913) 33 N.Z.L.R. 545 
(2) see also Nash v Nash In Re Cobb (1924) N.Z.L.R. 495 
( 1) 
been abrogated. However, there was no unanimous agreement 
on the further issue of whether the power to punish for the 
contempt of scandalising the court still existed when there 
was an alternative procedure by which an offender could be 
charged with seditious libel under the Crimes Act 1908. (
2 ) 
At one extreme, Cooper J. was of the opinion that the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to punish classes of contempt 
which were also indictable offences had been taken away by 
section 5. He regarded the parallel provisions in the Crimes 
Act 1908 as providing a specific mode of procedure which was 
inconsistent with the statutory contempt jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court. (3 ) He did not consider the problem from the 
aspect of the courts' inherent jurisdiction. 
Sim J. came to the opposite conclusion. He started with 
the proposition that the legislature could not have intended 
to take away completely the power to summarily punish contempt. 
He continued:-
"If the court's power to punish one class of such contempts 
has not been taken away by section 5, then it seems to me to 
follow necessarily that the power to punish summarily in all 
other cases remains also. It is a case of either all or 
nothing. I cannot agree with the reasoning that makes any 
( 4) 
distinction between the several classes of contempt. 
It is a clear implication of Sim J.'s judgment that the 
word 'offence' in section 5 was not to be taken as including 
criminal contempts. Of the other members of the court, only 
(1) (1913) 33 N.Z.L.R. 545, 556 per Stout C.J.; 561 per Williams J.; 
565 per Denniston J.; 580 per Cooper J.; 580 per Chapman J.; 
583-4 per Sim J. 
( 2) Sections 118 - 119 Crimes Act 1908. Now Sections 81 - 83 
Crimes Act 1961 
( 3) (1913) 33 N.Z.L.R. 545, 578 
( 4) (1913) 33 N.Z.L.R. 545, 584 
Williams J. reached the same conclusion that the power to punish 
for the contempt of scandalising the court had not been replaced 
by the seditious libel sections of the 1908 Crimes Act. (l) 
Stout C.J. did not express a view upon this point. Denniston J. 
tended to the opposite conclusion( 2 ) while Chapman J. delivered 
a short but equivocable judgment. Perhaps his judgment can be 
fairly summed up if he is taken as agreeing that the power to 
punish summarily had not been abrogated but that the jurisdiction 
should not have been invoked in the circumstances of the case. (
3 ) 
The same issue came before the Full Court in Nash v Nash In 
Re Cobb!
4
) Here the offender could have been charged under 
Section 138 of the Crimes Act 1908, (5 ) but was proceeded against 
summarily in the court's contempt jurisdiction. In delivering 
the judgment of the court, Salmond J. rejected the contention that 
had been previously raised in A~G. v Blomfield that the Crimes Act 
had completely superceded and abolished the courts' criminal 
contempt jurisdiction. (6 ) He went on to reject the view expressed 
by Cooper J. in the earlier case that the summary contempt 
jurisdiction was now confined to contempts that were not also 
indictable offences under the Crimes Act 1908. This opinion was 
inconsistent with the wording of section 5 which dealt with 
substantive law and not with possible alternative forms of 
procedure. (7 ) Salmond J. expressly approved the judgment of 
Sim J. in A.G. v Blomfield and concluded that section 5 was not 
(1) ibid 561 
( 2) ibid 564 
( 3) ibid 583 
( 4) (1924) N.Z.L.R. 495 
(5) cf. Section 117 Crimes Act 1961 
( 6) (1924) N.Z.L.R. 495, 496 
( 7) ibid 497 
intended to deal with contempts. (l) It merely abolished Common 
Law felonies and misdemeanours as the subject matter of an 
indictment and provided that only the offences in the 
Crimes Act or in some enactment not inconsistent with it should 
be the indictable offences:-
"This being so, the Supreme Court preserves unimpaired and 
unaffected its original jurisdiction to secure the efficiency 
and the purity of the administration of public justice by 
dealing summarily with all conduct which is recognised by 
the Common Law as amounting to contempt of court. (2 ) 
Section 9 of the Crimes Act 1961 now confirms the position 
taken by the Full Court in Nash v Nash In Re Cobb. The Court's 
summary jurisdiction is preserved in its entirety by the section. (3 ) 
While the problems connected with this issue have been solved, 
there remain a number of sections in the Crimes Act and other 
enactments, such as the Judicature Act, which also raise 
similar problems. 
(1) ibid 498 
(2) ibidem 
(3) Some statutes specifically exclude the jurisdiction. See 
section 23(3) Guardianship Act 1968; section 16(4) Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1963, cf. section 75 Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1963 
2) STATUTORY ENACTMENTS WHICH PROSCRIBE CONDUCT ALSO COVERED 
BY THE LAW OF CONTEMPT 
(a) Section 56C of the Judicature Act 1908 and 
Section 401 of the Crimes Act 1961 
Both these sections are headed 'Contempt of Court' and 
are expressed in identical terms. (l) Paragraphs (a) and (b) 
of sub-section one deal with what is traditionally described as 
'contempt in the face of the court'. 
Paragraph (a) is concerned with assaults, threats and 
insults to a judge, officers of the court, jurors and witnesses. 
It is a contempt punishable in the inherent jurisdiction to do 
any of the things which the paragraph mentions. (2 ) Taken 
literally, the paragraph is wider in one respect. As the learned 
editor of Adam's Criminal Law and Practice in New Zealand points 
out, (3 ) the words are capable of bearing the interpretation that 
any conduct in the nature of assaults, threats or insults to one 
of those mentioned therein would be punishable by the section, 
although quite unconnected with the proceedings. It is, therefore, 
suggested by Adams that the section must be interpreted restrictively 
and limited to conduct connected with the proceedings. If this 
interpretation is adopted, paragraph (a) would be of the same scope 
as the inherent jurisdiction, although it should be made clear that 
not all contempts which are punishable in the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court are covered by these sections. (4 ) 
With regard to paragraph (b) any interference with court 
proceedings is a contempt punishable in the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court. (S) 
(1) see Appendix I post 
(2) Borrie & Lowe p.10 - 11 
(3) Para. 3612 (2nd Ed. 1971) Hereinafter referred to as 'Adams' 
(4) For a complete list see Borrie & Lowe 5-34 
(5) Borrie & Lowe 15-18 
Paragraph (c) of sub-section one deals with disobedience to 
court orders and directions in the course of the hearing of any 
proceedings. Adams submits that the paragraph only applies to 
orders relating to, affecting or connected with, the hearing. (l) 
It must also be restricted to orders directed to persons present 
in the court or in its vicinity, as the sub-section goes on to 
provide that the offender may be taken into custody by order of 
the Judge and detained until the rising of the court. Disobedience 
d d . h f . . 1 . 1 ' 2 ) · to an or er ma e in t e course o a crimina tria is normally 
regarded as a criminal contempt. As paragraph (c) is restricted 
to where a person is in court or near at hand, it would seem that 
breach of such an order is a criminal contempt in the face of the 
courtr (
3
) punishable by section 401. In civil cases, with which 
section 566 of the Judicature Act is concerned, breach of orders 
made in the course of proceedings may or may not be regarded as 
criminal contempts. (4 ) It may be said that if the contempt is 
serious, the courts will be disposed to regard it as a criminal 
contempt. Furthermore , breach 0£ a court order may give rise to 
a criminal contempt in another way. An example is where a judge 
orders a witness to answer a question but he steadfastly refuses, 
whatever the classificatLon of the contempt involved in the original 
order the offender may be pun.ished for the criminal contempt of 
f 
. . . ( 5) 
re using to answer a proper question. 
The procedure under sub-section one by which an offender may 
be taken into custody and detained until the rising of the court 
is also actually available at Common Law. A warrant was not 
(1) Para. 3615 
(2) R. v Socialist Worker Printers & Publishers Ltd. (1975) 1 All. 
E.R. 151 
(3) see Part IV B post 
(4) Barrie & Lowe 369 - 374 
(5) ibid 28 
h . 1 h · d · ( l) nece ssary w i et e court continue to sit. In summary , it 
may be said that sub-section one adds little, if any thing, to the 
courts' powers to punish for conte mpt either procedurally or in 
subs tantive law. 
Sub-section two of both sections provides that a judge may 
impose a sentence of. not exceeding three months imprisonment or 
to a fine not exceeding $200 for every offence and in default 
of the payment of any such fine may direct that the prisoner be 
imprisoned for any period not exceeding three months. It is 
ins tructive to compare the courts' inherent powers of punishment 
for contempt. 
not limited by 
limit for both 
hand, in In Re 
It may imprison an offender to any term and is 
statute. ( 2 ) Furthermore, it may fine without 
criminal (J) and civil contempt. (4 ) On the other 
Gregory( S) it was doubted by Smith J. whether a 
court in the exerci se of its inherent jurisdiction could order 
imprisonment upon d efau lt o f payment of the fine. Adams, on the 
basis of various d ecisions o f the Privy Council submits that the 
dec ision should not be fo llowed. (
6 ) Smith J. furth e r held that 
even if that jurisd i c tion h ad ex i s t e d, the procedure was 
inconsistent with the s t a tu t o r y p r ocedure under the Crown 
Suits Act 1908. The pro v i sio n s relied on and which, in a modified 
form have been incorporated in section 20 of the Crown Proceedings 
Act 1950, enables a judgment to be entered. Now no special 
d f . . t . . 1 bl ( 
7 ) proce ure or imprisonmen is avai a e. It would, therefore, 
appear that there is no obs tacle in the path of the courts' 
inherent power and a s suming this to exist, it may b e concluded 
that the sub-section does not add anything to the courts' inherent 
powers, but on the contrary, restricts the power to imprison and fine. 
(1 ) Adams para. 3616; R v Stafford County Court Judge (1888) 
57 L.J.Q.B. 483 
(2 ) Barrie & Lowe 277 
( 3 ) ibid 283 
( 4) ibid 355-356 
( 5 ) (1940) N.Z.L.R. 983 
( 6 ) Adams Para. 3601 
( 7 ) Adams. P a ra. 3601 
It is now necessary to turn to sub-section 3 which provides 
that nothing in the section shall limit or affect the power of the 
court to punish for contempt of court in any case to which the 
section does not apply. At first sight the import of this 
sub-section is clear. It is designed to counter the possible 
arguement that this statutory enactment provided a codification of 
the law of contempt and that the inherent jurisdiction could no 
longer be invoked at all. The problem is that the section carries 
the implication that the inherent power cannot be exercised in 
any case to which the section applies. 
Adams takes the view where section 401 applies, its operation 
is exclusive of any other mode of enforcement. (l) This means that 
to the extent that section 401 applies, there has been an abrogation 
of the inherent jurisdiction. Woodhouse J. in Taylor v Attorney 
General (2 ) tended to agree with Adams:-
"Without expressing any final opinion upon the point, there is 
much force I think in these observations: and it is worth 
noticing that the section itself was introduced into the 
Crimes Act as recently as 1961. If this be right then the 
wilful breach 'in the course of the hearing of any proceedings' 
of any order, or direction whether made pursuant to s. 375(2) 
or in terms of the inherent jurisdiction, would seem to involve 
a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three months or a fine 
not exceeding $200." 
The other members of the Court of Appeal did not deal with 
this point, but it may be said that while Woodhouse J. was in this 
regard (as well as in the case of s. 46 Criminal Justice Act and 
s. 375 of the Crimes Act) prepared to take the view that the statutory 
provisions abrogated the inherent jurisdiction, this approach did not 
(1) Para. 3601 
(2) p. 19 of Woodhouse J.'s unreported judgment 
find favour with the other members of the Court. {l) 
As has already been mentioned, sections 401 and 56C restate 
in part what is covered by the inherent power of the court with the 
restriction upon the power of the court to fine and imprison. 
Even in the absence of the inference that may be drawn from 
sub-section three, there is a body of authority for the view 
that if a statute covers an area also covered previously by the 
Common Law, then any statutory restriction upon the exercise of 
that power must be complied with. In Attorney-General v De Keyser's 
Royal Hotel Ltd. (2 ) the Royal Prerogative was held to be so 
restricted by a statute. (3 ) In Pasmore v Oswaldtwistle Urban 
Council (4 ) Lord Halsbury L.C. cited a passage from the judgment 
of Lord Tenterden in Doe v Bridges:-( 5 ) 
"Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the 
performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a 
general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any 
other manner." (6 ) 
Pasmore's case was concerned with a different point than that 
which is in issue here but it does illustrate a principle of 
general application. Sometimes the courts are not willing to take 
(1) This will be further dealt with in connection with s.46 of the 
Criminal Justice Act and s.375 of the Crimes Act and some 
other miscellaneous sections. 







(1898) A. C. 
( 18 31) 1 B. 
(1898) A.C. 
508 @ 575 per Lord Parmoor 
38 
& Ad. 847, 849 
381, 394 
t hi s approach and will hold, as in Shand v Mi niste r of Ra i lwa y s , (l) 
t hat an inherent power survived the e nactment of a statute which 
contained an equivalent but more restrictiv e power. I t is 
submitted that the latte r is the preferable view to adopt here 
because of the restricted powers of punishment open to a court. 
The se are hardly adequate to meet every case that may arise. 
Section 56C was adde d to the Judicature Act in 1960 and, at 
the same time was placed in the Crimes Bill. In moving the 
second reading of the Judicature Amendment Bill the Attorney-General (
2 ) 
said that although the court had an inherent jurisdiction it was 
better to have express provisions. (
3 ) The section is, in fact, 
based on section 206 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 and section 112 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1947. These were in turn based on 
English County Court l egislation. It is difficult to see the force 
of t he Attorney-Genera l' s arg uement. The sections above are 
needed . to define the extent of the contempt jurisdiction of the 
inferior courts, but the Supre me Court has an ample inherent 
jurisdiction. It is, the r efo re, concluded that the s e ction shall 
eithe r be disposed o f or , al t ernat i ve ly, amende d so tha t it is 
clear that it does not rt~s t ric t the inhe rent jurisdiction. 
(b) Section 56B of t he ,Jud icature Act and 
Section 352 of the Cr ime s Act 
These sections are again expre ssed in ide ntical t e rms and we re 
added at the same time a s section 56C of the Judicature Act and 
section 401 of the Crimes Act. The refusal of a witness to be sworn 
or to give evidence has always been punishable in the inherent 
(1 ) (1970) N.Z.L.R. 615 (S.C. & C.A.) 633 per North P. and Turner J. 
cf. North Shore Toy Co~ Ltd. v Ste v e nson (1973) 1 N. Z.L. R. 562 
(2 ) Hon. H.G.R. Mason 
(3 ) N.Z.P.D. Vol. 325 p 3177 
(1) 
jurisdiction of the court. Under sub-section one the witness 
can justify his refusal by supplying 'just · excuse'. This is, 
however, merely declaratory of the inherent power. (
2 ) The 
statutory provisions are more restrictive in that the power of 
imprisonment is restricted to one week with power under sub-section 
two to imprison for further periods of one week. The section, 
therefore, creates a special procedure by which an offender is 
imprisoned and brought up .to the trial a week later (at the most). 
There is no power to fine or to imprison for an adequate period. 
In Re Holland, R v Green( 3 ) a witness was sentenced to eighteen 
mon ths for refusing to answer a question which resulted in the 
acquittal of the accused on a charge of using an instrument on 
herself to procure a miscarriage. The editors note to this case 
men tioned the possibility of an indictment under section 138(d) 
of the Crimes Act 1908(
4 ) but this would have been inappropriate 
when a rapid and efficient method of dealing with the offender is 
required. 
Adams deals with the inadequacie s of the section as follows:-
"The section seems to assume that a criminal trial normally 
continues for week after week, and, except where that 
happens, ·is unpractical as a means of securing the evidence. 
(5) 
It is also inadequate as a means of punishment." 
The worst feature of these sections is that they contain 
a s ub-section 3 which is identical to sub-section 3 of section 401 
of the Judicature Act and section 56C of the Crimes Act. This 
sub-section could be interpretated as meaning that the courts' 
(1 ) Borrie & Lowe 28-29 
( 2) idem 
(3 ) (1917) G.L.R. 424 
( 4 ) now section 117(d) Crimes Act 1961 
( 5 ) Para. 2799 
inherent jurisdiction is excluded in any case to which the 
sections apply with the consequence that an offender in a serious 
case would have to be proceeded against on indictment. It is 
submitted that these sections are superfluous. Ironically, when 
the Judicature Amendment Bill was introduced in 1960, the 
( 1 · 
Attorney-General made the following comment:- l 
"I do not suggest that these cover new subject matter; it is 
merely that some doubt has been expressed as to the adequacy 
of existing powers." 
If the above was the rationale of the amendment, then the 
wri ter is of the opinion that it has not been achieved. 
(c) Section 56A of the Judicature Act and 
Section 351 of the Cr i me s Act 
These sections both deal with the failure of witnesses to 
attend court, although t hey are not expressed in identical terms. 
Nei ther section refers to the courts' contempt powers but provides 
for the arrest of a witness so that he can be brought before the 
court. <
2 ) He then may be fined up to a limit of $100 in the case 
of section 56A and $200 in respect of section 351. (
3 ) The section 
in the Judicature Act which is concerned with civil proceedings is 
less rigorous in other respects. The witness may avoid the sanction 
of a fine by showing that he had 'just excuse' for his failure to 
attend. (4 ) Further, the witness is not compellable unless his 
h b d d 'd h' (
5 ) expenses ave een ten ere or pai to im. 
( l) N.Z.P.D. Vol. 325 p. 3051 
(2 ) Section 5 6A ( 1) , Section 351(1) 
( 3 ) Section 5 6A ( 2) , Section 351(2) 
(4 ) Section 5 6A ( 2) 
( 5 ) Section 5 6A ( 3) cf. Section 56BB 
In civil proceedings, attendance is enforced by the issue of 
a subpoena. (l) Disobedience to this is punishable as a contempt 
. h . . d' . f h ( 2 ) . . 1 in the in erent Juris iction o t e court. In crimina 
proceedings a subpoena is also available and could be enforced 
by contempt proceedings. There is the notice to attend under 
section 181 of the Summary Proceedings Act. It is this second 
procedure that section 351 of the Crimes Act is concerned with, as 
well as attendance under a writ of subpoena. 
It is submitted that neither of these sections prevents the 
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 
They provide an alternative procedure to obtain the presence of 
witnesses. Neither section purports to create a statutory 
contempt as in the case of section 401 of the Crimes Act and 
section 56C of the Judicature Act. If any parallel is to be 
drawn, the present sections are more akin to offences under the 
Crimes Act which, as we have seen, have been held not to abrogate 
the courts' inherent jurisdiction to punish the same class of 
behaviour. 
In the United Kingdom a uniform procedure for criminal cases 
has been enacted by the Criminal Procedure (Attendance of 
Witnesses) Act 1965. (3 ) This provides a number of methods for 
compelling the attendance of witnesses but the failure to obey 
is still punishable as contempt with a limited period of 
. . ( 4) 
imprisonment. 
A similar enactment to section 56A and section 351 is 
section 162 of the Juries Act 1908. (5 ) This provides for a power 
(1) Rule 173, 174 Code of Civil Procedure 
(2) Borrie & Lowe 25 
(3) 1965 C. 69; cf. Borrie & Lowe 27 
( 4) Section 3 
(5) as amended by 1960 No. 155, section 4; and 1963 No. 141 
section 6(1) 
to fine for non-attendance subject to the proviso that a person 
has been advised of his default and given a reasonable opportunity 
of appearing before the court. This area is also covered by the 
courts' inherent contempt powers and what has been said in 
connection with section 56A and section 351 would also, presumably 
apply here, although in the case of jurors the court would prefer 
the exercise of definite statutory powers. 
(d) Sections dealing with In Camera Hearings and the 
Suppression of the Names of Parties, Witnesses and other 
persons involved in court proceedings 
There are a large number of sections in various statutes 
whi ch empower the courts to order that proceedings shall be 
conducted -in camera or that the names of people connected with 
proceedings be suppres s ed. The Supreme Court also had an 
inherent jurisdiction in these matters and the extent of this was 
the central issue in the r ecent case of Attorney-General v Taylor & 
Edwards. {l) A detailed discussion of the inherent jurisdiction 
in this area is outside the ambit of this paper but some comment 
is desirable so that the extent of the inherent jurisdiction can 
be compared with the va~ious statutory provisions. 
The leading authority on the circumstances in which an in 
camera hGaring can be ordered is Scott v Scott. (
2 ) Here an in 
camera hearing was ordered for a nullity suit. One of the parties 
later sent a transcript of evidence to outsiders. It was held by 
the House of Lords that there was no jurisdiction to make the order 
in the circumstances of the case and, therefore, it was incompetent 
(1} (1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138; The Appeal to the Court of Appeal was 
heard on the 28th May 1975 
(2 ) (1913) A.C. 417. See also Skope Enterprises Ltd. v Consumer 
Council (1973) 2 N.Z.L.R. 399 
for the other party to take contempt proceedings to punish 
disobedience to the order. Viscount Haldane L.C. in the course of 
his judgment expressed the applicable principle as follows:-
"While the broad principle is that the courts of this country 
must, as between the parties, administer justice in public, 
this principle is subject to apparent exceptions But the 
exceptions are themselves the outcome of a yet more 
fundamental principle that the chief object of the Courts of 
Justice must be to secure that justice is done." ( 1) 
Earl Loreburn also expressed himself in similar terms:-
"It would be impossible to enumerate or anticipate all 
possible contingencies but in all cases where the public 
has been excluded with admitted propriety the underlying 
principle, as it seems to me, is that the administration 
of justice would be rendered impracticable by their 
presence, whether because the case could not be effectively 
tried, or the parties entitled to justice would be 
reasonably deterred from seeking it at the hands of the 
Court." (2 ) 
Their Lordships did mention a number of recognised classes of 
case where the courts will order an in camera hearing. Firstly, 
there is the paternalistic jurisdiction over wards of court and 
lunatics. This jurisdiction may give rise to an overriding 
principle that the procedure is regulated in the interests of those 
whose affairs are in his charge. (3 ) Secondly, there is the 
situation where there is litigation as to a secret process. The 
(1) (1913) A.C. 417, 437 
(2) ibid 446 
(3) ibid 437 per Lord Haldane L.C.; 445 per Earl Loreburn. 
cf. Re X (a minor) (1975) 1 All E.R. 697 
effect of publicity may be to destroy the subject matter of the 
litigation and it could then be said that the paramount object 
of doing justice could not be achieved in open court. (l) Yet 
another situation is mentioned in the judgement of Earl Loreburn. 
A court may be closed and cleared if the trial is rendered 
impracticable because of the presence of the public. As an 
example he gave the existence of tumult or disorder or the 
first apprehension of it. (2 ) One other category has achieved 
recognition. In wartime an in camera hearing may be necessary 
to ensure the safety or defence of the realm. (3 ) 
power 
It is now necessary to turn to the courts to prevent the 
publication of the names of people connected with proceedings. 
Until recently there was hardly any authority in this area of 
the law( 4 ) but in R. v Socialist Worker Printers & Publishers Ltd. 
exp. Attorney-General (5 )the Queens Bench Division dealt with 
this issue. The judge in a blackmail case had directed that 
the names of the witnesses who had been the victims of the 
blackmail should be referred to by letters as in the Sutch trial. 
At a later stage in the trial an article appeared in the "Socialist 
Worker" which revealed the neames of the witnesses. In committal 
proceedings taken by the Attorney-General it was argued first 
that the order did not extend to ordering the press not to disclose 
the names of the two witnesses. (6 ) Lord Widgery C.J. admitted that 
this was correct but said it did not make any difference:-
"The real vice of this publication can only be judged by 
imagining a person suffering blackmail who is trying to 
(1) ibid 437 per Lord Haldane L.C.; 445 per Earl Loreburn 
(2) ibid 445 
(3) E v G (1939) l M.C.D. 7, 11-12 per Salmon S.M. Also, R. v 
Governor of Lewes Prison exp. Doyle (1917) 2 K.B. 254 and 
Jones v New Zealand Newspapers Ltd. (1942) 2 M.C.D. 360 
(4) See case note (1975) N.Z.L.J. 151 
( 5 ) ( 19 7 5 ) 1 Al 1 E . R . 14 2 
(6) ibid 149 per Widgery C.J. 
screw up his courage to go to the Police and do something 
about it . " ( 1 ) 
The publication frustrated the purpose of the order. As the 
learned author of a recent article in the New Zealand Law Journal 
said, the form of the order is not the sole consideration and one 
may be guilty of contempt if one violates the spirit of the order 
f 
. ( 2) 
or rustrates its purpose. 
The more important arguement was that the judge had no power 
to suppress the names of witnesses in his court. In effect the 
defence argued that there were only two alternatives open to the 
judge. He could order an in camera hearing but only in the 
circumstances covered by Scott v Scott (3 ) or he had to have 
a completely open hearing with no restrictions on publications. 
This was rejected by the Divisional Court. ( 4 ) Lord Widgery C.J. 
firstly commented that the present situation is not unlike the 
exception to Scott v Scott which deals with secret processes:-
"The complainant in the blackmail charge has a secret which he 
shares with Miss Janie Jones, a secret which he has been 
paying money to keep a secret. If by coming to court in 
order to see that she is charged with her offence, he must 
give up his secret, there is, one would think, a parallel 
of some consequence between the different proceedings. 11 ( 5 ) 
This would not justify the hearing of blackmail charges in 
camera but it would justify the lesser course of suppressing 
the names of witnesses. Lord Widgery C.J. thought that there 
was a vast difference between the evils of an in camera hearing 
( 1) idem 
( 2) (1975) N.Z.L.J. 150 
( 3) ( 1913) A. C. 417 
( 4) (19 7 5) 1 All E.R. 142, 149 - 150 
( 5) ibid 150 
and the suppression of witnesses' names. If an in camera hearing 
is ordered, the supervision of the public is gone, while if names 
are merely suppressed, the supervision of the public is still 
there for nearly all purposes. (l) There was no need for the court 
to choose between the stark alternatives of an in camera hearing 
or total publicity:-
"! think that there is a third course suitable and proper 
for this kind of case of blackmail where the complainant 
has done something disreputable or discreditable and has 
something to hide and will not come forward unless thus 
protected." ( 2 ) 
Lord Widgery C.J. held that there was a contempt made out 
in the present case on two grounds. Firstly in that it was an 
offence to the court to disobey the order and secondly that the 
act was calculated to interfere with the course of justice by 
making blackmail victims more reluctant to come forward for 
fear of publicity. ( 3 ) 
The Socialist Worker case did not define the extent of the 
courts' 'half way house' jurisdiction to suppress names. Indeed, 
it was mentioned that the courts had not given similar protection 
to rape victims and that it may require legislation to do it. (4 ) 
This may, however, be because of the very different considerations 
. 1 · . ( 5) prevai 1ng in rape cases. 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court & the Court of Appeal 
in Attorney-General v Taylor & Edwards( 6 ) also dealt with the same 
(1) ibid 150 
(2) (1975) l ALL E. R. 142, 151 
(3) idem 
(4) idem 
(5) idem cf. Attorney-General v Butterworth (1962) 3 ALL E.R. 326, 329 
(1963) 1 Q.B. 696, 719 per Lord Denning M.R. 
(6) (1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138; Court of Appeal - Judgment 11th July 1975 
issue. In the course of the trial of Dr. Sutch under the 
official Secrets Act Beattie J. on the application of the 
Attorney-General and consented to by counsel for the accused, 
made the order as follows:-
"By consent I make an order prohibiting the publication of 
anything that may lead to the identification of officers 
of the New Zealand Security Service. They will be 
described by a letter or symbol in each case." (l) 
The order made in this case is thus much wider than that 
made in the Socialist Worker case. It purports to prohibit all 
mention of the names of the Security Service members who gave 
evidence at the trial for all time. The order would have 
achieved its purpose if it had restricted publication of the 
fact that the particular members were witnesses at the trial. 
This is perhaps what the order meant. Taken literally it could 
be interpreted to mean that the mention of the Security Service 
members' names without more in the social column of a newspaper 
was a breach of the order. (2 ) 
Another important difference from the Socialist Worker case 
is that the publication occurred after the end of the Sutch Trial. 
Beattie J. held that it did not and founded himself upon the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Butterworth. (3 ) 
This case involved victimisation of a witness after the end of the 
trial. This was held to be contempt as interfering with the course 
(1) (1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138, 139 
(2) See p.2 of the judgment of Woodhouse J. (dissenting) in A.G. v 
Taylor & Edwards (judgment 11th July 1975) 
(3) (1963) 1 Q.B. 696 
of justice. As Donovan L.J. said, the administration of justice 
is a continuing thing. (l) The victimisation was a clear affront 
to the authority of the court and likely to interfere with the 
administration of justice by making other witnesses reluctant 
to come forward. ( 2 ) 
The main issue in the Taylor & Edward's case was the question 
whether there was any jurisdiction to make the order simpliciter. 
Counsel for Taylor argued, as had already been done in the 
Socialist Worker .case, that unless there was an order that the 
trial be heard in camera, the court had no power to limit 
publication in any intermediate form. Beattie J. also rejected 
this contention and relied in so doing upon the Socialist Worker 
case, ( 3 ) which he did not consider was restricted to blackmail 
cases. The court could order an in camera hearing or a completely 
open hearing:-
.. . "or it can depart fr om the 'stark alternatives' and take 
a third course, a s wa s t a k e n here, of maximum public 
participation s a v e for the prote ction of state s e curity. 
I, therefore, r e j e ct Mr . Elli s ' "all or nothing" argument. 11 ( 4 ) 
Beattie J. stressed t he wide ranging effect of the inherent 
jurisdiction to punish b y the contempt process any act which 
interfere s with the admini s tration of justice:-
"Conduct which amount s to contempt may take a wide variety 
of forms, but once it is e s tablished that it does interfere 
with the administration of justice, in my opinion there is 
jurisdiction to deal with it. 11 ( 5 ) 
(1 ) ibid 725 
(2 ) ibid 719 
(3 ) (1975) 1 All E.R. 142 He would also have found support in cases 
which establishe d the courts' power to delay reporting: 
R v Clement (1821) 4 B. & Ad. 218; 106 E.R. 918; See also 
Barrie & Lowe 85 - 86 
(4 ) (1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138, 146 
(5 ) ibid 147 
He then went on to hold that the acts of the respondents 
affected 'the administration of justice as a continuing thing.' 
There are difficulties in this conclusion. It cannot be 
seriously argued that the Security Intelligence Service witnesses 
would not come forward if their names were published. There is 
nothing in the Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 that 
prohibits the publication of agents' names and a list could be 
compiled by anyone if they wished. In wartime different 
considerations prevail but this was not the situation in this case. 
The misgivings expressed by the writer found some support in the 
Court of Appeal where Woodhouse J. dissented. Before turning to 
this judgment, it is proposed to consider the position taken by 
the majority. 
Wild C.J.'s judgment, in common with the other judgments 
delivered, can be divided into four basic areas of discussion:-
(1) Their consideration of the inherent jurisdiction to 
punish for contempt; 
(2) Interpretation of the order made by Beattie J. in the 
Sutch Trial; 
(3) The applicability of the inherent jurisdiction to the 
present case; 
(4) The effect of the numerous statutory provisions upon the 
inherent jurisdiction. 
No. (1) above has already been discussed and No. (4) will be 
mentioned presently; for the moment we will concentrate on 
Nos. (2) and (3). 
Wild C.J. accepted that a judge in a criminal trial has power 
in appropriate circumstances to direct that a witness is not obliged 
to disclose his name but is to be referred to by a letter. In this 
respect he followed the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division in 
R. v Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers ex. p. A.G. (l) Like 
Beattie J. in the Supreme Court, Wild C.J. rejected counsel's 
arguement that the judge must choose between the 'stark alternatives' 
of an in camera hearing or a fully open hearing. 
cases the limited third course is open. (2 ) 
In appropriate 
His Honour then went on to consider the terms of the order. 
Counsel for the appellant had conceded that the order was limited 
to thos members of the Security Intelligence Service that gave 
evidence at the trial of Dr. Sutch. However, counsel argued that 
the terms of the order were so wide as to prohibit any publication 
concerning these officers. This did not find favour with the 
Chief Justice:-
"The Order must, I think, be read as a whole and in the 
context of the other order made contemporaneously. (3 ) So read 
I think it was limited to publications relating to the trial 
of Sutch." 
Wild C.J. pointed out that the prosecution had not sought 
to obtain an order excluding the public as it could have done under 
section 15(3) of the Official Secrets Act 1951, but only a limited 
order as set out. The essence of his decision is contained in a 
long passage which followed:-
"In that situation the Judge was, in my opinion, bound to 
recognise and give effect to the will of Parliament as 
reflected in the Act that the Security Service should be 
maintained as an effective instrument to protect national 
security. Having regard to the nature of the charge and the 
evidence in the depositions there was plainly ample ground 
for the view that public disclosure of the names of the 
(1) (1975) l All E.R. 142 
(2) p.5 of his unreported judgment 
(3) The "other order" related to the taking of photographs, 
making of sketches and notes without prior permission. 
witnesses would impair the effectiveness of the Security 
Service to carry out that statutory function." 
The implication from the above passage is that the extent of 
the inherent jurisdiction is somehow determined by the will of 
Parliament as expressed in legislation from time to time in force. 
In wartime, there is authority for the view that the inherent 
jurisdiction extends to order a trial in camera when this may be 
necessary to ensure the safety of the state. These hearings 
preserve the anonymity of the secret agents but the justification 
of such order remains in the premise that the administration of 
justice could not be carried on in public. (l) A more limited 
order was made here. 
view that:-
It may be that Richmond J. is correct in his 
" ... in the lesser situation of protecting the identity of 
witnesses at a hearing in public a somewhat less strict 
test is applicable in determining the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court. " ( 2 ) 
Despite a less strict test, an order may still be justified 
as necessary for the due administration of justice as a continuing 
thing. The Chief Justice seems to accept that the inherent 
jurisdiction is determined by the requirements of the 'interests 
of justice' : -
" ... an order which did no more than prohibit publication of 
anything that would lead to the identification of those 





interests of justice to protect a service whose duty, 
case itself demonstrated, includes bringing to justice 
alleged offences against the Official Secrets Act 1951." ( 3) 
(1) Scott v Scott (1913) A.C. 417, 438 per Viscount Haldane L.C. 
(2) p. 5 of his unreported judgment 
(3) p.6 of the Chief Justice's unreported judgment 
It remains uncertain whether the 'interests of justice' are 
to be equated with the "due administration of justice." This 
same issue is also raised by the judgment of Richmond J. Some 
aspects of his judgrnent should, however, be mentioned first. 
Richmond J. contrasted the situation where the public is 
totally excluded with the limited order made in the Socialist 
worker Case(l) and in the present one. While the test from 
Scott v Scott (2 ) is that the power exists only where by nothing 
short of the exclusion of the public could justice be done, 
Richmond J. as already mentioned, considered that a less strict 
test is applicable when the identity of witnesses is protected 
at an otherwise open hearing. He did not find any precise test 
formulated by the Queen's Bench Division in R. v Socialist Worker:-( 3 ) 
" ... but it is clear that it could not have been said that 
unless the names were suppressed it would be virtually 
impossible for the processes of justice to be carried out 
The strict test laid down in Scott v Scott was adopted because 
a hearing in secret would run counter to the basic principle 
of the Common Law that every Court of Justice is open to 
every subject of the King (per the Earl of Halsbury at p.440)" (4 ) 
Richmond J. went on to examine the provisions of the Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969. While the Act does not contain 
anything expressly relating to the preservation of the secrecy 
of its officers, he thought it a "matter of common sense" that in 
many of the functions of the service the anonymity of its officers 
was important. Richmond J. also showed the same deference to the 
Legislature that was present in the judgrnent of the Chief Justice:-
" ... the Government of this country has seen fit and continues 
(1) (1975) 1 All E.R. 142 
(2) (1913) A.C. 417 
(3) (1975) l All E.R. 142 
(4) p.5 of Richmond J.'s unreported judgrnent 
It remains uncertain whether the 'interests of justice' are 
to be equated with the "due administration of justice." This 
same issue is also raised by the judgment of Richmond J. Some 
aspects of his judgment should, however, be mentioned first. 
Richmond J. contrasted the situation where the public is 
totally excluded with the limited order made in the Socialist 
Worker Case(l) and in the present one. While the test from 
Scott v Scott (2 ) is that the power exists only where by nothing 
short of the exclusion of the public could justice be done, 
Richmond J. as already mentioned, considered that a less strict 
test is applicable when the identity of witnesses is protected 
at an otherwise open hearing. He did not find any precise test 
formulated by the Queen's Bench Division in R. v Socialist Worker:-( 3 ) 
" ..• but it is clear that it could not have been said that 
unless the names were suppressed it would be virtually 
impossible for the processes of justice to be carried out 
The strict test laid down in Scott v Scott was adopted because 
a hearing in secret would run counter to the basic principle 
of the Common Law that every Court of Justice is open to 
every subject of the King (per the Earl of Halsbury at p.440) 11 ( 4 ) 
Richmond J. went on to examine the provisions of the Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969. While the Act does not contain 
anything expressly relating to the preservation of the secrecy 
of its officers, he thought it a "matter of common sense" that in 
many of the functions of the service the anonymity of its officers 
was important. Richmond J. also showed the same deference to the 
Legislature that was present in the judgment of the Chief Justice:-
" •.. the Government of this country has seen fit and continues 
(1) (1975) 1 All E.R. 142 
(2) (1913) A.C. 417 
(3) (1975) l All E.R. 142 
(4) p.5 of Richmond J.'s unreported judgment 
to see fit to maintain a security service. That being so this 
court should accept without question that the continued 
existence and efficiency of the Security Service is a matter 
affecting the safety and interests of the state." (l) 
He further considered that because of the existence of the 
Official Secrets Act 1951 and its close link to the Security 
Service it should be accepted that it was in the 'interests of 
justice' that the security service should continue as an efficient 
service capable of policing the Official Secrets Act. The 
anonymity of the members was important in enabling them to 
carry out their function. It was in accordance with the 
requirements of justice that the courts should give the protection 
of suppression of the names of officers when giving evidence at a 
trial under the Official Secrets Act 1951. His conclusion was that:-
11 ••• the direction given by Beattie J. that the officers of 
the service should be referred to by a letter, in each case, 
was a direction which, in my opinion, it was within his 
jurisdiction to give. It was linked with the administration 
of justice because the need for the direction arose from the 
attendance of the officers to give evidence at a trial in open 
court and also because the interests of justice, as a 
continuing process, required the effectiveness of the Service 
to be preserved." (2 ) 
Richmond J. thus found that the order was necessary for the 
due administration of justice for two reasons. The first, it is 
submitted, should not be accepted without reserve. The writer has 
already discussed this precise point in connection with the 
judgment of Beattie J. in the Supreme Court. The second reason for 
Richmond J.'s decision is similar to the basis advanced by Wild C.J. 
(1) p.7 Richmond J. 's judgment 
(2) ibid p. 8 
(. 
for his decision. Both these members of the Court of Appeal 
held that the order was necessary in the 'interests of justice'. 
It is suggested that this concept is considerably wider and 
more pervasive than the traditional basis for the inherent 
jurisdiction - that the courts' powers are exercised to prevent 
interference with the due administration of jsutice. Many matters 
may be in the interests of justice without being the sine qua non 
of the effective administration of justice. 
Woodhouse J. in his dissenting judgment took a different 
approach to both the interpretation of the terms of the order 
made by Beattie J. and the application of the inherent jurisdiction 
to the present case. He first considered the question whether 
the order was designed to prohibit anything that may lead to the 
identification of the officers as witnesses at the trial or to 
prohibit anything that might disclose their status as security 
officers. 
Woodhouse J. thought that there was an 'inherent ambiguity' 
arising from the position of the position of the two sentences 
of the order - the one suppressing publication and the other 
concerning the use of symbols in court. He was, however, of the 
opinion that:-
"For the most part ... the order would be read without further 
thought in the more general or second sense indicated above." (l) 
In a later passage he said:-
"Taking into account what the average man would think to be the 
far more practical reasons for avoiding the identification of 
such officers in the wider sense of status together with the 
(1) p.3 of Woodhouse J. 's judgment 
seemingly unqualified words of the order itself I think it 
improbable that it would be read in the confined sense 
submitted by the Crown."(l) 
He went on to refer to authority to the effect that disobedience 
to an order will not amount to contempt where the order is uncertain 
or misleading. Non lawyers should not be left in doubt whether it 
was possible to limit the prima facie wide terms of the order by 
rules of interpretation. If the wrong decision is arrived at they 
could end up in prison. He did not think that many people would 
ass11ffie that it s meaning was restricted to the officers as witnesses:-
"Instead I believe most would regard the order as concerned 
to preserve the wider status of those men as agents and 
whether or not such information was confined to the 
proceedings in court. So read, the order was outside the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court." 
( 2) 
Woodhouse J. further held that even if the order could be 
interpreted in a restricted sense previously mentioned, it was 
still beyond the inherent jurisdiction of the court. He referred 
to R. v Socialist Worker( 3 ) where the basis for the court's power 
to order suppression was that the order was necessary in the 
interests of the future administration of justice. 
In the present case, Woodhouse J. was of the opinion that 
the question was not whether the Security Service would suffer 
inconvenience by publication of the names of witnesses or whether 
the witnesses themselves would be disadvantaged in some way 
unconnected with the trial:-
"The real question is whether their anonymity as witnesses 
(1) ibid p. 4 
(2) ibid p. 5 
(3) (1975) 1 All E.R. 142 
was required in the long term interests of justice itself and 
in contrast to their anonymity as agents which the court 
could not protect •.. At best I think the very limited 
advantage of the permissable order would bear upon the 
administrative convenience of the service (should) (l) be 
regarded perhaps as a matter of public interest. But I am 
unable to understand how that sort of public interest can 
be equated with the continuing interests of the administration 
of justice where the identification of the men as security 
officers can be proscribed only in relation to their role 
as witnesses at the trial and yet be left wide open to 
publication by reference to their status as agents alone. 
So that even if the order could be read in the limited sense 
f h . . h . d . h .. d' · .. (2 ) I am o t e opinion tat it was ma e wit out Juris iction. 
It can be seen from this passage that there is a fundamental 
disagreement between the majority and Woodhouse J. on the question 
of what type of orders are necessary to protect the continuing 
interest of justice. He considers the administrative convenience 
of the Security Service to be perhaps a matter of public interest. 
This may, in the present situation, be simply another name for the 
'interests of justice' in the sense used by the majority. If this 
is so, it gives added weight to the view that the dictates of the 
interests of justice is not an appropriate standard to measure 
the inherent jurisdiction by. 
In the New Zealand context, there are 
provisions dealing with in camera hearings 
evidence and names. Section 375(1) of the 
numerous statutory 
and suppression of 
Crimes Act( 3 )provides 
(1) The word 'should' does not appear in the judgment of Woodhouse J. 
It is an attempt to make sense of this particular sentence. 
The words which do appear are:- "and so" 
(2) p. 6-7 Woodhouse J.'s judgment 
(3) By section 396 the powers under section 375 are extended to 
the Court of Appeal. See also section 322(3); section 35 & 
156 Summary Proceedings Act; section 111 Domestic Proceedings 
Act 1968. 
that the public may be excluded from the proceedings if the 
court is of the opinion that it is requirt d i L the interests of 
justice or of public morality or the reputation of any victim 
of an alleged sexual crime or crime of extortion. Section 375(2) 
provides that in any case in which the court is empowered to exclude 
the public it may make an order forbidding publication of any 
report of the evidence. Breach of the order is to be dealt with 
as contempt of court. Section 375(3) makes it clear that 
section 375 is not to limit the courts' powers under section 46 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1954. 
This is a comprehensive provision which covers most 
situations in criminal proceedings in which it would be necessary 
to order an in camera hearing or to suppress evidence. Adams(l) 
points out that the reference to the interests of justice is new 
but it was covered previously by the inherent jurisdiction. 
Blackmail and rape are both covered and so the difficulties that 
were mentioned in the Socialist Worker case( 2 ) about the suppression 
of the names of rape victims do not exist here. Where any 
prosecution is commenced under the Official Secrets Act 1951 
section 15(3) empowers the court to order an in camera hearing. 
If ther2 wa~ tunmlt in the court( 3 ) then presumably the public 
could be excluded in the interests of justice. We may conclude 
that as far as criminal trials are concerned, it will be usually 
possible to rely on section 375 rather than the inherent jurisdiction. 
It is interesting to speculate whether publication of evidence of 
the Sutch Trial could have been prohibited under this section. The 
writer submits that the section is not wide enough to do this. It 
would have to be left to the inherent jurisdiction (if any ). 
(1) Para. 3218 
(2) (1975) 1 All E.R. 142, 151 per Lord Widgery C.J. 
(3) See e.g. (1913) A.C. 417, 445 per Earl Loreburn. 
There are two other provisions which deal with the 
suppression of evidence. Section 84(1) of the Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1963 provides that a court may prohibit the 
publication of any report or account of the evidence. Breach 
of this prohibition is to be dealt with as contempt of court. 
we have already seen another example of a "stat: .. 1tory" contempt 
in section 375(2). The jurisdiction to prohibit publication of 
evidence in matrimonial proceedings had been exercised prior 
to the 1857 Act in the United Kingdom by the Ecclesiastical 
Courts but, as the judgment of the House of Lords in Scott v 
Scott(l) shows, this jurisdiction did not survive the transfer 
of jurisdictioD to the High Court. Consequently, legislation 
was required. Even if the court does not make an order under 
section 84(1) only certain particulars may be published pursuant 
to section 84(2). By section 84(3) publication in contravention 
of section 84(2) is punishable by fine or imprisonment. 
Another section that should be mentioned is section 15 of 
the Evidence Act 1908. It prohibits anyone from printing 
or publishing any question or inquiry which has (a) been forbidden 
or disallowed or which (b) the judge has warned the witness 
he is not obliged to answer and has ordered shall not be published. 
By sub-section two anyone who contravenes the section commits a 
contempt of court. This statutory contempt is considerably wider 
than the inherent jurisdiction. In some instances, the court 
may have been able to restrict publication as interfering with 
the course of justice but this would be rare. The section also 
applies to the Magistrates Court. 
Finally, section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 1954 must 
be mentioned. Section 46(1) gives the court (including a 
Magistrate's Court) power to prohibit the publication in any 
report relating to any proceedings in respect of any offence, of 
the name of a person accused or convicted of an offence, or the 
(1) ibid 436 per Viscount Haldane L.C.; 446 per Earl Loreburn 
name of any other person connected with the proceedings. The 
rest of the section deals with the commencement and duration of 
the order and subsection six provides that anyone who contravenes 
the section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction 
to a fine of up to $100. 
The section does not lay down any guidelines for the exercise 
of the power. It can in theory be exercised in any situation and 
for a reason quite different from the 'interests of justice'. Thus 
it may be concluded that the power is considerably wider than the 
inherent jurisdiction to suppress names which was firmly extablished 
in the Socialist Worker case. (l) While the jurisdiction under 
sec tion 46 may be wider, the courts may still wish to proceed under 
the inherent jurisdiction if the situation is covered by it. The 
reason is the very limited power of fine in section 46(6). In 
Attorney-General v Taylor & Edwards( 2 ) Beattie J. mentioned that 
there was no express p r ohibition of the Common Law power and the 
Crown had elected to b r ing the motion on the basis of the court's 
inher ent jurisdiction. He rejected the argument that the inherent 
jurisdiction had b e en abrogated by statute:-
"In my opinion, this inherent jurisdiction has not been 
circumscribed by a statute which allows for a relatively 
meagre penalty to be imposed for more trivial cases of 
disobedience where the consequences are not of far reaching 
effect." (3 ) 
Beattie J. went on to fine Taylor $1000. It is submitted that 
Beattie J.'s conclusion upon this point is correct. Leaving aside 
( 1 ) ( 19 7 5 ) 1 Al 1 E . R . 14 2 
(2 ) (1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138, 
(3 ) ibid 148 
the inadaquacy of the penalty provided for by section 46(6), 
it may be noted that section 46(6) creates an 'offence' which is 
defined in section 2(1) of the Crimes Act 1961. An indictable 
offence which is also a contempt does not exclude the courts' 
· . . d' . (l) d h . d d inherent Juris iction an t e same reasoning may be exten e 
to summary offences. Furthermore, it has always been accepted 
that a court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction even if the 
matter is regulated by statute unless doing so would expressly 
contravene some statutory provision. (
2 ) 
The Court of Appeal in Taylor v Attorney-General(
3 ) also 
considered the effect of the statutory provisions upon the 
inherent jurisdiction. 
Wild C.J. first referred to section 15(3) of the Official 
Secrets Act which permits the courts to exclude the public from 
a hearing on the ground that publication would be prejudicial 
to the safety or interests of the state. The power was not 
invoked in this case and as Wild C.J. pointed out, the provision 
is "in addition to and without prejudice to" any power to exclude 
the public. 
He then went on to mention section 46 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1954, and section 375 of the Crimes Act. His Honour raised 
the point that neither of these sections extend to authorising an 
order or direction that witnesses be referred to by letters. 
He concluded that:-
"Both provisions are empowering and, therefore, should not, in 
the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, be construed 
(1) Nash v Nash In Re Cobb (1924) N.Z.L.R. 495 
(2) Master Jacob, "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court" 
Current Legal Problems (1970) p.24 
(3) Unreported Judgment 11th July 1975 
as reducing powers. Accordingly, I cannot regard either 
provision, or any other, as excluding or limiting the inherent 
f h t ff • 1 • h • • • • d • • II ( l) power o t e cour to act e ective y wit in its Juris iction. 
Richmond J. came to the same conclusion. He referred to 
section 15(3) of the Official Secrets Act and section 46 of the 
Criminal Justice Act. He too held that the latter section 
did not abrogate the inherent jurisdiction. He could not find 
any intention in the section to abrogate this power:-
"An empowering provision of this kind should not be 
interpreted as impliedly abrogating an inherent power of 
the court unless the statutory provision is in some way 
repugnant to the continued existence of the statutory 
power, as opposed to strengthening the inherent power 
by widening it, or extending it or by providing an 
alternative remedy." (2 ) 
Richmond J. was equally of the view that section 375 did not 
abrogate the inherent jurisdiction and agreed with Beattie J. 
that there was no statutory power incompatible with the existence 
of the inherent jurisdiction exercised in this case. He pointed 
out that none of the various statutory provisions authorise the 
use of letters or symbols which give greater protection to 
witnesses than a mere order suppressing publication. He went 
on to say that the appellant could have been found guilty of 
contempt if the Crown had solely relied on the Judge's direction 
to use symbols as in the Socialist Worker case where there was no 
express order prohibiting publication. 
Woodhouse J. took a different approach to the effect of the 
statutory provisions upon the inherent jurisdiction. He was of 
(1) p.9 Wild C.J.'s judgment 
(2) p. 14 of Richmond J.'s judgment 
the opinion that an order could have been under section 46 of the 
Criminal Justice Act. He also mentioned section 375 and section 401 
of the Crimes Act and tended to agree with Adams that section 401 
abrogates the inherent jurisdiction to the extent that it applies. 
He pointed out that section 375(2) would empower the prohibition 
of the publication of any name and continued:-
"However, the power is narrower in relation to naming persons 
connected with the proceedings than the power defined in 
section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act - because it is 
limited to the requirements inter alia of the interests of 
justice: and yet it is wider than the power derived from 
the inherent jurisdiction - because section 375 can operate 
on grounds of the requirements of public morality."(l) 
This medley of overlapping powers available to the courts does 
not exhibit any clear legislative intention. They do not cover the 
situation where a Judge orders that a witness is to be referred 
to by a letter or symbol. In these circumstances, the writer 
would respectfully agree with the majority in this case that these 
provisions are not repugnant to the exercise of the inherent 
jurisdiction. In the words of Richmond J. they have the effect of 
"strengthening the inherent power by widening it, or extending 
it or by providing an alternative remedy." It is difficult to 
agree with Woodhouse J. 's conclusion which follows:-
"Taking into account the very wide discretion given the court 
by section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act to deal with such a 
matter as this, the breadth of the power contained in 
section 375 of the Crimes Act and also the implications that 
arise from section 401 of the same Act, I think the statutory 
provisions may be intended (so far as they extend) to be in 
substitution for the pre-existing inherent jurisdiction of the 
court." (2 ) 





B. JURISDICTION OF THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS 
(1) The Jurisdiction to Punish Criminal Contempts 
Inferior Courts of Record, in the absence of statutory 
provisions, do have a limited power to punish criminal contempts. 
It is restricted to those contempts which are committed in the 
face of the court. This was affirmed in R. v Lefroy. 
( 1) 
Cockburn J. said:-
"I think that the judge of a County Court has no authority 
to punish for contempt not committed in the face of the 
court." (2 ) 
All Courts of Record have power to punish contempts 
committed in the face of the court as a necessary incident of 
the due administration of justice. Contempts committed outside 
the court do not fall into this category and have to be punished 
in the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. ( 3 ) 
This would apply to Magistrates' Courts which are largely 
modelled upon the English County Court system and it is a 
Court of Record. ( 4 ) Whilst the inherent jurisdiction is not 
in doubt, it became customary to confer statutory jurisdiction 
on the County Courts and this has been followed in New Zealand. (5 ) 
The main sections which confer this statutory power are 
(1) (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 134 See also Queen v Brampton County Ct. 
(1893) 2 Q.B. 195, 198 - 200 
(2) ibid 137 
(3) post Part II C 
(4) see section 31 Magistrates' Courts Act 1947 
(5) A similar jurisdiction has been conferred upon other special 
courts and tribunals :- see Section 95 Royal New Zealand Air 
Force Act 1950; Section 56 Maori Affairs Act 1953; Section 145-
146 Industrial Relations Act 1973 cf. sections 4, 9, 13 of the 
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908 
( 
section 112 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1947 and section 206 
of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. Both these sections have the 
d
. ( 1) 
same wor 1ng. 
These sections raise problems of the same kind that were 
encountered with the equivalent sections dealing with the 
Supreme Courts' statutory powers. (2 ) While the Magistrates' 
Courts' powers were limited to contempts in the face of the 
Court, there was no fixed limit to the power of fine or 
imprisonment as there is in the case of section 112 and section 206. 
Furthermore, as has been observed in the case of the Supreme Court 
sections, ( 3 ) not all behaviour which may be regarded as contempt 
in the face of the court is covered by these sections. (4 ) This 
being so, then sections 112 and 206 are restrictive of the courts' 
powers unless the argument is accepted that the courts 1 inherent 
powers are preserved. The judgment of the Queen's Bench Division 
in R. v Lefroy(S) would appear to be conclusive against this 
view :-
"We, therefore, must. understand the legislature to have 
confined the power to the instances given and to the extent 
limited. 11 ( 6 ) 
The basis of this view is that since the legislature has 
enacted a provision in the area of contempt in the face of the 
court and provided limited penalties, it would be inconsistent 
with Parliament's inte ntion to ignore the limitation placed upon 
these powers and punish for a contempt not included in the section 
or impose a greater fine or term of imprisonment than is provided for. 
(1) See Appendix 2 post 
(2) See Part IA(2) (a) ante 
(3) Section 401 Crimes Act; section 56C Judicature Act 
(4) See Part IA(2) (a) ante 
(5) (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 134 
(6) ibid 138 
The writer has already argued against the acceptance of this 
view in connection with the Supreme Court, but it is submitted 
that different considerations apply here. The contempt powers 
of inferior courts are limited to contempts in the face of the 
court. These sections, therefore, purport to cover the whole 
a rea of the courts' power and, consequently, the argument that 
t here has been a complete codification of the courts' powers 
i s much more attractive. There is the additional consideration 
t hat a Magistrate's court, as an inferior court, should have its 
powers strictly prescribed and any behaviour not coming within 
t hese sections or any other provision can be dealt with in the 
s upervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
The equivalent section in the County Courts Act 1959 (U.K.) (l) 
i s very similar but there is no equivalent of paragraph (c) 
which is concerned with disobedience to orders of the court in the 
course of proceedings. The learned author of Wily's Magistrates' 
Court Practice & Tenancy Legislation <2 ) in a note to section 112 
mentions the fact that paragraph (c) is new. (3 ) He then expresses 
the view that it is designed to provide a Magistrate with a greater 
power of control over the conduct of the court and enables him to 
deal with witnesses who refuse to answer questions. It is possible 
t o conceive that there may be situations pertaining to a Magistrate 
keeping control of his court which do not come within paragraphs 
(a ) and (b). On the other hand the court does have the 
additional power of expulsion in order to preserve order and 
decency in the Court. (4 ) Furthermore, the court has specific 
(1 ) section 157 
(2 ) 7th Ed. (1973) 
(3 ) p. 208 
(4 ) R. ~ O'Neil (1885) 6 N.S.W.L.R. 43 per Martin C.J.; 
see also R. v Mathews (1887) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 48 
s tatutory powers to invoke against witnesses. By section 20(5) 
o f the Summary Proceedings Act and section 4(1) (a) of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act, there is specific power to fine 
wi tnesses for non-attendance. Refusal to answer questions in 
criminal proceedings is covered by section 39 of the Summary 
Proceedings Act (imprisonment for seven days) and in civil 
proceedings by section 54(1) (b) of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
In summary, it may be said that the court has adequate powers to 
deal with witnesses in the absence of paragraph (c), which, 
as has already been observed in the dase of the Supreme Court 
provisions, is somewhat out of place in a section otherwise 
dealing with criminal contempts. 
Another difference between sections 112 and 206 on the 
one hand and section 157 o f the County Courts Act 1959 on the 
other concerns pena lty . I n Ne w Ze aland, a $20 fine or 
imprisonment for ten days is provided for. In England, it is a 
twenty pound fine or one mo nth's i mprisonment. While it is 
di fficult to be categor ical. upon the subject of penalty , it is 
submitted that the Un ited Kingdom provisions are nearer the 
appropriate penalty -· a t l east a s far as the power to imprison 
is concerned. The wr i ter i s of the opinion that a fine of up to 
$2 00 would be appropriate having regard to the considerable 
inflation that has occurre d. This would bring the penalty more 
into line with that for a ssault and like offences. 
After an offender has been committed under the provisions 
of sections 112 and 206 for a definite period, there is no 
specific power given to revoke the order. In England, section 157(2) 
of the County Courts Act 1959 provides that a judge may, at any 
time, revoke an order committing a person to prison and if he is 
already in custody, order his discharge. 
( 
(2) Disobedience to Court Orders Prohibiting the Publication of 
Evidence or Suppressing the Names of Persons Connected with 
Proceedings and the Power to Order in Camera Hearings. 
The Magistrates' Court has an inherent jurisdiction to hold 
a hearing in camera when it is necessary for the proper 
administration of justice. In E v G (l) Mr. Salmon S.M. 
applied the principles laid down in Scott v Scott ( 2 ) to 
proceedings before the Magistrates' Court, although on the 
particular facts of that case, he held that the grounds for such 
an order were not made out. ( 3 ) Again in Jones v New Zealand 
Newspapers Ltd. (4 ) Mr. Luxford S.M. applied Scott v Scott (S) 
to the situation where the Crown had to give evidence of a 
secret nature in wartime in the course of a prosecution under 
war time censorship regulations. 
While the Magi str·atcs ' jurisdiction to order in camera 
hearings was establi she d in E v G ( 6 ) it was doubted whether the 
Magistrates' Cour t ha~ power to make the further order to forbid 
the publication of proceedings. Mr. Salmon S.M. said:-
"Such powers may exis t in the higher courts where the power 
to exercise the inherent jurisdiction arises, but it would 
be difficult to find authority for the proposition that 
this court has this additional power." 
( 7) 
One may be entitled to think that if a magistrate has the 
p ower to order an in camera hearing then, of necessity, he has 
(1 ) (1939) 1 M.C.D. 7 
( 2) ( 1913) A.C. 417 cf. R. v Governor of Lewes Prison ex p. Doyle 
(1917) 2 K.B. 254 
(3) (1939) M.C.D. 7, 12 
( 4) (1942) 2 M.C.D. 36 0 
( 5) (1913) A. C. 417 
( 6) supra 
(7) (1939) 1 M.C.D. 7, 9 
( 
the lesser power to order evidence or a name not to be published. 
This is the reasoning behind the Court of Appeal's decision in 
R. v Socialist Worker Printers & Publishers Ltd. (l) It is 
suggested that a Magistrate may take a new approach to the 
jurisdiction to suppress publication in the light of this case. 
The Magistrates' Court also has extensive statutory 
jurisdiction to suppress names and evidence. Some of these 
provisions have already been considered in connection with the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction but are equally applicable to the 
Magistrates' Court. (2 ) The most important section is section 35 
of the Summary Proceedings Act. (3 ) By section 35(2) the court 
may exclude the public from the court where it is of the opinion 
that the interests of public morality or the reputation of any 
victim of an alleged sexual offence or offence of extortion 
require it. In the equivalent section in the Crimes Act -
section 375 - the court can also exercise the power where the 
'interests of justice ' demand it. Adams( 4 ) comments that this 
is covered by the inhe rent jurisdiction. 
Section 35(3) provides that where a court has power to make 
a direction under section 35(2) and whether or not it makes a 
direction, the court may make an order forbidding the publication 
of the whole or any part of the evidence. Breach of section 35 
renders the offender liable to a $100 fine. (
5 ) 
The equivalent section where there is a preliminary hearing 
of an indictable offence is section 156 of the Summary Proceedings 
(1) (1975) l All E.R. 142 
(2) e.g. section 46 of the Criminal Justice -Act 1954; Section 15 of 
the Evidence Act 1908 
(3) By section 122 the Supreme Court on appeal is given the same 
powers. 
(4) Para. 3218 
(5) See section 35 (5) 
' 
Act. The two sections are very similar except that the interests 
of justice is added as a ground for making an order excluding 
the public, (l) although it is not a ground for forbidding the 
publication of evidence. (2 ) It is difficult to see the reason 
for these differences. In the case of section 156 at least, 
they seem intentional although the writer does not feel able to 
subscribe any reason for their existence. It is submitted that 
section 375 of the Crimes Act and sections 35 and 156 of the 
Summary Proceedings Act should be standardised, with the 
exception that breach of a direction under section 375 of the 
Crimes Act should still constitute contempt of court. 
(3) Enforcement of Judgments and Orders in Civil Proceedings 
Section 79 of the Magistrates' Courts Act contains detailed 
provisions as to the enforcement of orders and judgments in civil 
proceedings. The writer's present interest in this section stems 
from its use of contempt procedures for enforcement. Section 79(1) 
is concerned with the enforcement of a judgment or order for the 
payment of a sum of money. One of the methods is proceedings 
under the Imprisonment for Debt Limitation Act 1908. This Act, 
as in the case of its English equivalent( 3 ) has a special 
statutory committal procedure and curtails the right to imprison 
for disobedience to a judgment to pay a sum of money. The format 
of the proceedings are, however, still based on the concept of 
contempt. 
(1) Section 156(1) 
(2) Section 156(2) 
(3) The Debtors Act 1869 (U.K.) as amended by the Administration 
of Justice Act 1960, section II. See Borrie & Lowe 363 
( 
Section 79(2) covers orders and judgments in the nature of 
an injunction and any judgment or order within the competence 
of a Magistrates' Court which, if it were made in the Supreme 
Court, could be enforced there by a writ of attachment. These 
judgments and orders are enforced in the Magistrates' Court by 
committal for a term not exceeding three months. This remedy 
is not available in the case of recovery of land(l) but section 
79(3) enacts that the appropriate remedy shall be under a warrant for 
recovery of land. 
Section 79(2) is unfortunately worded, for, although 
attachment is the remedy mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure 
and committal is not, (2 ) it is clear that committal is an equally 
appropriate contempt procedure in the Supreme Court. ( 3 ) Moreover, 
in the case of a solicitor breaching his undertaking to the 
court and a sherriff failing to return a writ of attachment, 
committal is the only remedy. (4 ) The consequence is that upon a 
strict view of the availability of remedies, a Magistrates' Court 
has no jurisdiction to punish a solicitor for the breach of his 
undertaking. It is submitted that section 79(2) should be 
amended to provide that the Magistrates' Courts have the power to 
order committal in the same circumstances as committal and 
attachment are available in the Supreme Court. A provision of this 
kind is inserted in the County Court Rules( 5 ) but it is no longer 
strictly necessary in England as committal is available in all 
cases of contempt. (6 ) 
(1) Proviso to section 79(2) 
(2) cf. Rule 392 Code of Civil Procedure 
(3) Vol. 9 Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Ed.) para. 87 note 4. 
( 4 ) D v A & Co . ( 19 0 0 ) l Ch . 4 5 4 
(5) Ord. 25 r. 67 County Court Rules 1936 
( 6) R. S. C. Ord. 5 2 rule I ( 1) 
( 
Another feature of section 79(2) is that a Magistrate 
proceeds by committal (l) while a judge of a County Court in 
England proceeds by way of attachment. (2 ) This is only a 
difference in name as in each case it is the only remedy 
available but the differences are strange in view of the fact 
that attachment is the favoured remedy in our Code of Civil 
Procedure while it is committal in England. 
The period of committal is restricted to three months 
imprisonment here, while there is no limitation upon the power 
of the County Courts. The existence of a limitation upon the 
power of imprisonment may be thought to be desirable not only in 
the case of the Magistrates' Courts but also the Supreme Court. 
This topic receives detailed attention at a later stage. (3 ) 
One last point deserves to be mentioned. No specific power 
to fine for civil contempt is given to the Magistrates' Courts 
except in so far as paragraph (c) of section 112 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act and section 206 of the Summary Proceedings 
Act concern civil contempts. It is suggested that a remedy should 
be available for use when other procedures are inappropriate. 
(1) See Rules 258, 262, 263 Magistrates' Court Rules 1948 
(S.I. 1948/197). Also section 97 & 98 Magistrates' Courts 
Act 1948 
(2) Borrie & Lowe 360 
(3) See Part VII A post. 
( 
C. THE SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has a jurisdiction to punish contempts of 
inferior courts so as to ensure the due administration of justice. 
This was confirmed in a number of cases early this century. (l) 
The supervisory jurisdiction covers civil hearings, summary 
criminal proceedings and preliminary hearing of indictable 
offences. ( 2 ) The jurisdiction also extends to punish contempts 
of other special courts such as court martials. ( 3 ) 
The main case affirming the existence of such a jurisdiction 
in New Zealand is R. v McKinnon. (4 ) Here the editor of the New 
Zealand Truth was fined for his contempt in publishing evidence 
after the Justices of the Peace had made an order forbidding 
publication under the equivalent of what is now section 375 of the 
Crimes Act 1961. This case was followed in Attorney-General v 
Blundell(S) where newspapers were fined for their contempt in 
publishing a contempt of the Arbitration Court. ( 6 ) One question 
that is raised by these cases is the question whether the Supreme 
Court has a concurrent jurisdiction when the inferior court 
also has a jurisdiction by statute to punish a particular kind of 
( 7) contempt. In Attorney-General v Blundell Myers C.J. was of 





R. V Parke (1903) 2 K.B. 432; R. v Davies (1906) l K.B. 332 
see also R. v Clarke exp. Crippen (1920) 103 L.T. 636 
R. v Davies (1906) l K.B. 332 
R. v Daily Mail ex parte Farnworth (1921) 2 K.B. 733 
(1909) 30 N.Z.L.R. 884 
(5) (1942) N.Z.L.R. 287 
(6) ibid 290 - 291 
(7) (1942) N.Z.L.R. 287 
(8) By section 115 of the Industrial Conciliation & Arbitration Act 
1925 cf. section 146 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 
( 
. 1 . . h. . f t ( l) which was exc usive wit in its area o compe ence. His Honour 
reached this conclusion even although the format of section 115, 
which is a section similar to section 112 of the Magistrates' 
courts Act, provides for a fine rather than for the behaviour 
to be punished as a contempt. It is submitted with respect that 
this obiter statement of Myers C.J. should not be followed. The 
alternative procedure should be open for serious contempts in the 
face of the court, expecially in the situations covered by the 
contempt in the face sections of the Magistrates' Courts Act( 2 ) 
and Summary Proceedings Act. (3 ) 
(1) (1942) N.Z.L.R. 287, 290 
( 2) Section 112 
(3) Section 206 
( 
PART III 
INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT 
Proceedings in criminal contempt may be brought by any person, 
although normally contempts in the face of the court are punished 
by the court upon its own motion, and those out of court by the 
Attorney-General. In cases of civil contempt, proceedings are 
almost invariably brought by a party to the original litigation, 
although anyone has a right to do so. 
The writer's present concern is mainly with the issue of 
who should be entitled to initiate proceedings for criminal 
contempt. In the civil contempt situation, it will usually be 
a party to some civil action who brings contempt proceedings. 
This person is likely to have a legitinate interest in doing so, 
(e.g. to enforce an injunction). Furthermore, a party would not 
wish to prejudice his position by an abuse of the courts' 
process. 
It is considerably different with criminal contempt. Often 
it will be the general public interest in maintaining the due 
administration of justice rather than any particular interest which 
is affected. Consequently, the Attorney-General as the 
representative of this public interest, is the appropriate person 
to bring proceedings. Sometimes a party in a civil trial or the 
accused in a criminal trial can claim to be specially affected. 
Most of these situations occur when a newspaper comments adversly 
upon the party or the accused or upon the merits of the case. 
However, the motive of the individual is often not to vindicate the 
interests of justice but to forward his own interests against 
another party. (l) In other cases, contempt proceedings have 
(1) Chapman v Honig (1963) 2 Q.B. 502 
( 
been brought (unsuccessfully) to stifle comment from newspapers 
which did not, in fact, tend to prejudice the administration of 
. . ( 1) 
Justice. 
The potential for abuse of the criminal contempt process 
has led to suggestions for reform. (2 ) The Justice Report on 
Contempt of Court reconunended that no proceedings be brought 
f or criminal contempt except by or with the consent of the 
Attorney-General. ( 3 ) The reason given was the initiation of 
unmeritorious proceedings simply to claim costs. (4 ) Against 
the change is the criticism raised by Lord Elwyn-Jones when 
he was Attorney-General. (5 ) He thought that a complainant 
may not be satisfied with the Attorney-General's decision when the 
Crown is a party to the proceedings. 
A reform along the l i ne s of the Phillimore Conunittee would 
h
. . . . ( 6) overco~e t is criticism. 'rhe Committee recommended that the 
attention of the At t o ~n e y-Gen e r a l should be drawn to the matter 
before private proceeding s are begun. This would give the 
At torney-General an opportunity to take over the proceedings. 
(1 ) e.g. Vine Product s Ltd. v Green (1966) Ch. 484. 
R. v Duffy exp. Na sh (1960) 2 Q.B. 188 
(2 ) This abuse has, in fact not been evident in reported New 
Zealand cases but this does not mean to say that it cannot 
occur. For some Ne w Ze aland cases - see e.g. Macassey v 
Bell (1974) 2 N.Z. Jur. 55, 158; R. v Henningharn, (1869) 
Mac. 712; Cameron v Otago Daily Times & Witness Co.Ltd. (1868) 
Mac. 645; Na sh v Nash In Re Cobb (1924) N.Z.L.R. 495; 
Adams v Walsh et al (1963) N.Z.L.R. 153 
(3 ) cf. Lord Goddard C.J. in the unreported case of R. v Hargreaves 
ex parte Dill (no. 2) (1953) see Barrie & Lowe 265; 
Justice Re port "Contempt of Court" p. 34 
(4 ) See Laskell and Chambers v Hudson Dodsworth & Co. (1936) 
2 K.B. 595, 603 p e r Lord Goddard C.J.; also Plating Co. v 
Farquharson (1881) 17 Ch. 49, 56 per Cotton B.J.; 57 per 
Jar.ies L.J. 
(5 ) Barrie & Lowe p. 266 
(6 ) para. 187 
( 
This is an adequate and reasonable reform in the English context as 
the private individual would still have to obtain the leave of the 
court before an application for an order of committal could be made! 1 ) 
In New Zealand there seems to be no requirement that the leave 
of the court must be obtained before proceedings are initiated. 
However, in two cases a private individual actually did seek the 
leave of the court. In Adams v Walsh( 2 ) leave to commence 
attachment proceedings against officials of the Federation of 
Labour was granted upon the condition that the Attorney-General 
be informed of what steps had been taken so that he could, if he 
thought fit, take over proceedings. The Solicitor General 
appeared to explain the Attorney-General's decision not to take 
over proceedings, but Barrowclough C.J. expressed the opinion 
that it would have been better if the Attorney-General had, in 
fact, taken the proceedings over. (3 ) In the later case of 
M . 11 . . ( 4 ) 1 . d orris v We ington City eave to issue was grante on 
similar terms to Adam's case and the Attorney-General did elect 
to take the proceedings over. 
The procedure followed in the above cases is a valuable 
safeguard but it is suggested that a reform upon the English 
model should be adopted. A private individual would have to 
notify the Attorney-General of their intention to bring proceedings 
so that he could decide whether they should be continued in his 
name. The Rules of Court should, also, be altered so that the 
leave of the court is required to initiate proceedings. 
(1) R.S.C. Ord. 52 r.2 (1) 
(2) (1963) N.Z.L.R. 158 
(3) ibid 158 
(S.I. 1965/1776) 
(4) (1969) N.Z.L.R. 1038; cf. 1040 per Wild C.J. 
( 
PART IV 
THE SUMMARY PROCESS BY WHICH THE COURTS 
EXERCISE CONTEMPT JURISDICTION 
The court's inherent jurisdiction to punish contempt is 
said to be exercisable summarily:-
II it is a criminal offence ... and the only offence 
that I know of which is punishable at Common Law by 
summary process."(l) 
The alternative processes are no longer used. Criminal 
Information has been abolished in New Zealand and in the 
United Kingdom. (2 ) The further process of indictment has 
fallen into disuse and the writer has not been able to find 
an instance of its use in New Zealand. The last case in England 
in which it is said to have been invoked was in 1902. ( 3 ) 
The meaning of summary process is somewhat hard to pin down, 
although its essential nature can be established by comparison 
with other forms of court procedure. The definitional problem 
is enhanced in that "summary process" serves to describe both 
the procedure when a court acts upon its own motion and when 
contempt proceedings are initiated by an individual whether he is 
a party to the original proceedings or the Attorney-General or 
some other private individual. 
(1) per Lindley L.J. in O'Shea v O'Shea & Parnell (1890) 15 P.D. 
59, 69; see also A.G. v Blornfield (1913) 33 N.Z.L.R. 545, 568-9 
(2) Criminal Law Act 1967 (U.K.) section 6(6) In New Zealand 
no provision similar to section 361(1) of the Crimes Act 1908 
was inserted in the Crimes Act 1961. See also R. v Parke 
(1903) 2 K.B. 432, 442-3 per Wills J.; R. v Davies (1906) 
l K.B. 32, 41. Archb. (38th Ed.) Para. 3456 
(3) R. v Tibbits and Windust (1902) l K.B. 77 
( 
Master Jacob has recently explained the meaning of summary 
( 1) process as follows:-
"It means the exercise of the powers of the court to punish 
or to terminate proceedings without trial i.e. without 
hearing the evidence of witnesses examined in open court."( 2 ) 
It is now proposed to discuss proceedings upon motion 
and proceedings upon the court's own motion in turn. 
A. Proceedings Commenced Upon the Motion of an Individual 
When proceedings are commenced by notice of motion, there 
is no prosecution as such, the basic method of evidence taking 
is by affidavit, and there is no jury. A person can be cross 
examined upon his affidavit( 3 ) and the rule that a court cannot 
call evidence itself without the consent of the parties does not 
apply to contempt proceedings, whether they are civil or crimina1! 4) 
Even civil contempt is of a criminal character. (5 ) If a person 
refuses to swear an affidavit, he may be brought before the court 
upon subpoena. (6 ) While the Crimes Act provisions relating to the 
right to be represented by counsel and to be present throughout 
the trial seem inapplicable to contempt proceedings, it is not in 
doubt that these rights exist. 
Contempt has always been regarded as a species of criminal 
(1) The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court. Current Legal 
Problems (1970) p. 29 
(2) cf. R.S.C. Ord. 38 r.l which provides that any fact to be proved in any action by witnesses shall be proved by the 
examination of witnesses orally and in open court. 
(3) Morris v Wellington City (1969) N.Z.L.R. 1038, 1040 
(4) Yianni v Yianni (1966) 1 W.L.R. 120, 124 
(5) idem 
(6) Morris v Wellington City (1969) N.Z.L.R. 1038, 1040 
offence(l) and a trial in which evidence is adduced orally before 
a jury is one of the fundamentals of our criminal process. As 
already mentioned, indictment was previously a method of 
punishing contempt but has fallen into disuse. This departure 
from normal criminal procedure has always been justified on the 
ground that:-
" ... it can be set in motion rapidly in order to deal with a 
threat to the administration of justice. A prejudicial 
publication shortly before a trial, for example, may need to 
be brought before the court without delay in order to 
prevent a recurrence. 11 ( 2 ) 
One may have thought that it is not apt to compare civil 
contempt proceedings with the usual criminal process but as 
Lord Denning M.R. pointed out in Re Bramblevale( 3 ) civil 
contempt is also an offence of a criminal character and must 
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In general terms, there has 
been a tendency to assimilate the two types of contempt and 
recently the classification has been criticised as "unhelpful 
and almost meaningless." (4 ) 
The main basis of criticism of the summary procedure upon 
motion is that it is inappropriate for determining disputed 
questions of fact. The offender cannot cross examine the 
applicant's witnesses except upon matters appearing in their 
respective affidavits. Further, he cannot put forward oral 
evidence in his own defence. In England, the law has been 
( 1) O'Shea v O'Shea & Parnell (1890) 15 P.D. 59, 69 per Lindley L.J. Re Bramblevale (1970) Ch. 128, 137 per Denning M.R. 
(2) Phillimore Report Para. 17 
(3) (1970) Ch. 128, 137 
(4) Jennison v Baker (1972) 2 Q.B. 52 
( 
anunended and it is now provided that an alleged contemnor can 
now give evidence upon his own behalf. (l) In most contempt cases 
the facts are not in dispute but this is not inevitably the case. 
If there are disputed facts, they should be fully canvassed orally 
and a finding arrived at. There is then the question of how this 
should be done. One way of dealing with this problem would be 
to revive indictments for criminal contempt. This suggestion was 
taken up by Justice in its Report, Contempt of Court. ( 2 ) In 
Attorney-General v Butterworth( 3 ) Pearson L.J. in an obiter 
statement said:-
"In this case it has not been contended on either side that 
there is an alternative procedure by indictment (which, 
though said to be disused, could be revived) and that it 
would be a more suitable procedure in a case such as the 
present since after the conclusion of proceedings there is 
prima facie no pressing need for prompt disposal of the 
matter and trial by jury would be appropriate for determining 
the intention or purpose of each of the defendants. 11 ( 4 ) 
As the law stands at the moment, there would be no obligation 
to proceed by indictment if this procedure was revived. The 
initiative would be with the person who commenced the proceedings. 
If indictment was made mandatory, the reasoning behind the 
existence of the summary process would be defeated and indictment 
would be of little value when facts were not in dispute. 
Furthermore, while civil contempt is an offence of a criminal 
character for most purposes, it seems unreasonable for a litigant 
to have to go to the trouble of initiating proceedings by 
( 1) R.S.C. Ord. 52 r. 6 (4) see also Part V C Post 
(2) p. 28 - 29 
(3) (1963) l Q.B. 696 
(4) ibid 728 
(5) see Justice Contempt of Court p. 28 - 29 
( 5) 
( 
indictment in order to enforce a judgment or order. Justice in 
its Report did not recommend any change in the law, but the writer 
cannot agree with this conclusion. 
It is suggested that an intermediate reform could be 
adopted. The judge who is hearing the motion for committal 
or attachment could deternine disputed ques t ior ts of fact by the 
oral e x amination of witnesses in the us·ual way. While affidavit 
evidence would still be appropriate in most cases, where there 
was disputed evidence, the matter could be determined by much 
the same process as is adopted in civil trials before a judge 
alone. This reform has the virtue of removing the main cause 
of criticism of the summary process without neutralising its 
advantages of speed and efficiency. 
B. Proceedings Commenced by A court Acting Upon its own Motion 
While proceedings upon motion involve some departure from 
the criminal process of indictment, the curtailment of the 
rights of an individual are even more severe when the court acts 
upon its own motion. An offender may be co~mitted instantly 
without any formal initiation of proceedings b y notice of motion. (l) 
This does not mean that a person can be adjudged to be guilty of 
a contempt of court without any opportunity of making a defence. 
In Re Pollard ( 2 ) the Privy Council held that:-
(1) 
" ... no person should be punished for contempt of court, 
which is a criminal offence, unless the specific offence 
charged against him be distinctly stated, and an opportunity 
of answering it given to him ... " 
( 3) 
Watt v Ligertwood (1874) L.R. 2 Sc & Div 361 
See also Halsbury (4th Ed.) Vol 9 Para 89 and cf Balogh v 
st. Alban's Crown Court (1974) 3 All E.R. 283, 293-4 per 
Lawton L.J. 
(2) (1869) L.R. 2 P.C. 106 
(3) ibid 120 
( 
The opportunity of answering the case against a person 
has been held to involve:-
"An opportunity for explanation and possibly the correction 
of misapprehension as to what had been, in fact, said or 
meant." ( l) 
In the more recent case of Appuhamy v Queen, (2 ) where a 
statutory contempt procedure was involved, the Privy Council 
held that it was not necessary to state the charge with the 
particularity required in a court of an indictment. ( 3 ) If the 
court is of the opinion that the whole of a witness's evidence 
is false, it is sufficient to say that~ But if it is not 
suggested that the whole of the evidence is false, then the 
witness must be informed as to which parts are alleged to be false. 
Not to do so was, in the opinion of the Privy Council, a denial 
of the opportunity of explanation and of correcting a misapprehension 
as to what has been said or meant. ( 4 ) 
Thus an alleged contemnor is afforded a certain requisite 
minimum of procedural protection as far as having knowledge of 
and answering the case against him. This right may be only of 
limited value unless the offender is entitled to counsel to 
represent him. The courts have laid down no absolute rule that 
an offender is entitled to counsel. This matter was raised in 
Balogh v St. Alban's Crown Court. (S) Here the judge had 
proceeded upon his motion against a person who was found making 
preparations to put laughing gas in one of the court's ventilation 
(1) per Lord Collins in Chang Hang Kiu v Piggott (1909) A.C. 312, 316 
(2) (1963) A.C. 474 (P.C.) 
(3) ibid 483 per Lord Dilhorne L.C. 
(4) idem 
( 5 ) ( 19 7 4 ) 3 Al 1 E . R . 2 8 3 
.. 
( 
systems. The person was denied legal representation and 
immediately sentenced to six months imprisonment. On appeal 
Lord Denning M.R. was of the opinion that the facts did not 
warrant immediate punishment and that a remand in custody was 
called for so that counsel could be invited to represent 
the offender. (l) Stephenson L.J. thought that:-
"There may be cases where it is proper because necessary 
to commit a contemnor without giving legal representation 
(A) judge can always ask counsel to represent a conternnor 
as Park J. did in Moore v Clerk of Assize, Bristo1f 2 ) and 
for my part, I would hope that there would be few cases -
Morris v Crown Office ( 3 ) was one, but this case, in my 
judgment, was not - where this course should not be taken 
if counsel is available. There is every reason not to cut 
means of justice which are of necessity curt if not rough 
even shorter than they need be." (4 ) 
The Court of Appeal thus severely liraited the situations 
in which a court could proceed without permitting an alleged 
contemnor to have the benefit of counsel. The Phillimore 
Report which was not able to consider the Balogh case recommended 
that a conternnor should be entitled to be legally represented 
and that emergency legal aid should be granted. (5 ) It is 
submitted that this is the correct view. The writer does not 
agree that any amount of expedition or urgency could override 
this basic right in contempt cases. 
( 1) ibid 289 
( 2) (1972) 1 All E.R. 58 
( 3) (1970) 2 Q.B. 114 
( 4) (1974) 3 All E.R. 233, 293 
( 5) Para. 32 
In view of the almost arbitrary nature of the summary process 
when a court acts upon its own motion, the situations in which a 
court is able and should exercise this power is of some importance. 
This issue was dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Balogh v St. 
Alban's Crown Court. (l) Lord Denning M.R. started off with the 
time honoured view that a court can act on its own motion when 
the contempt is committed in the face of the court. (2 ) The 
trouble is that the definition tends to be circular - contempt 
in the face of the court is contempt which the court can punish 
on its own motion. Lord Denning preferred the expression 'contempt 
in the cognizance of the court'. ( 3 ) He continued:-
" ... a judge of the superior courts or a judge of assize 
could always punish summarily of his own motion for contempt 
of court whenever there was a gross interference with the 
court of justice in a case that was being tried, or about to 
be tried, or just over - no matter whether the judge saw it 
with his own eyes or it was reported to him by the officers 
of the court, or by others - whenever it was urgent and , , t 11 ( 4) imperative to act a once. 
Later on in Lord Denning's judgment there is a clear 
implication that it is not every case of contempt in the face of 
the court that a court should act on its own motion. Although the 
situation may fall within a traditional category of contempt a 
judge should not act upon hiw own motion unless it is 'urgent and 
. · . d . t 1 ' ( S ) I th imperative to act imme ia e y. no er cases:-
" ... he should not take it upon himself to move. He should 
( 1) (1974) 3 All E.R. 283 
( 2) ibid 287 
( 3) idem 
(4) ibid 287 
( 5) ibid 288 
leave it to the Attorney-General or to the party aggrieved 
to make a motion ... The reason is so that he should not 
appear to be both prosecutor and judge; for that is a role 
which does not become him well." ( 1) 
In the present case, Lord Denning was of the opinion that 
the judge was right to act upon his own motion to the extent of 
having the appellant brought before him. But at this stage, 
there was not sufficient urgency for summary punishment to be 
needed. He should have been remanded in custody and counsel 
arranged to represent him. (2 ) Lord Denning thus seems to 
advocate a 'half-way house' for use where the facts warrant it. 
The judgment of Stephenson L.J. does not fit so clearly 
into the pattern which emmerged from that of Lord Denning's, 
but it is submitted that he reached much the same conclusion. 
He firstly expressed the same view as to the scope of contempt 
in the face of the court. It was not limited to behaviour 
literally in the face of the court but extended not only to 
disobedience to court orders and breaches of undertakings but also to:-
" ... interference with the administration of justice which 
satisfy two conditions: (1) that the contempt is clearly proved 
beyond reasonable doubt, and (2) that it affects or is 
calculated to affect the course or outcome of judicial 
proceedings in being - that is, in the words of Lord Diplock 
in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd. ( 3 ) 'actually 
proceeding or is known to be imminent' - unless immediately 
(1) idem 
( 2) ibid 2 89 
(3) (1974) A.C. 273, 308 
( 
stopped by the apprehension and, if necessary, the detention 
of the offender."(l) 
Stephenson L.J. would also agree that although the summary 
jurisdiction may, in theory, be available, it should not always 
be invoked. The ends of justice must really require the drastic 
means. (
2
) In the present case the facts alleged to constitute 
contempt were admitted, but there was no need for immediate 
. h ( 3) punis ment. 
It is interesting to note that Lord Denning's 'half way house' 
approach received recognition by Lord Justice Stephenson. He was 
of the view that some contempts may require immediate action but 
not immediate punishment. He did, however, differ on the question 
whether this intermediate step should have been employed in the 
present case. He considered that the appellant should have been 
left to be punished for a theft of the gas cylinders taken for 
the purpose of putting them in the ventilation system. This view 
is partially dictated by the court's finding that the appellant's 
( 4) action fell short of an actual contempt. Since no contempt 
took place and there was no interference with court the judge 
should not have taken any steps at all. The view expressed by 
Lord Denning would seem to be preferable as the court should have 
the power to obtain the presence of the offender in order to 
determine whether a contempt has actually been committed. Lawton L.J. 
dealt with this point when he said:-
"Once there was reasonable grounds for thinking that a contempt 
(1) (1974) 3 All E.R. 283, 292 
(2) idem 
(3) ibid 290 
(4) See 289 per Lord Denning; 290 per Stephenson L.J. 
of court had been committed, no matter where, Melford 
Stephenson J. had jurisdiction to deal with it surnrnarily."{l) 
Lawton L.J. in his judgoent, agreed with other members of the 
Court of Appeal on the question of when a court should act of its 
own motion. He thought that it should only be used:-
" ... for the purpose of ensuring that a trial in progress 
or about to start can be brought to a proper and dignified 
end without disturbance and with a fair chance of a just 
verdict or judgment. Contempts which are not likely to 
disturb the trial or affect the verdict or judgment can be 
dealt with by motion to commit." { 2) 
Lawton L.J. did not specifically deal with Lord Denning's 
intermediate category. He was much more cautious in determining 
whe ther the court should have acted upon its own motion in the 
present case. He was ' doubt f ul' as the exercise may not have been 
necessary to safeguard the orde rly continuation of the trial in the 
ne ighbouring court or the integrity of the jury there. ( 3 ) 
This case is an interesting example of judicial reform, but 
more far reaching reforms have also been advocated. The exercise 
of the power upon the court's own motion can be criticised as 
basically contrary to natural justice. The judge is prosecutor, 
of ten the main witness and judge of the matter. In order to do 
away with the most objectionable feature of this power and, at the 
s ame tine to preserve its rationale, Justice in its Report 
(1 ) ibid 294 
(2 ) ibid 295 
(3 ) idem 
( 
Contempt of Court suggested that a judge should have power to 
direct proceedings for contempt to be taken before another judge. (l) 
A limited power of punishment would be retained for minor casesr (2 ) 
which deserve only a small sentence or fine. This, in effect, 
would be similar to the jurisdiction conferred by section 401 of 
t he Crimes Act 1961. Borrie & Lowe( 3 ) agreed with this reco~endation 
a nd drew on the process of certification of a contempt which is done 
i n the United Kingdom by a chairman of a Tribunal of Inquiry under 
t he Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. 
The Phillimore Committee examined this problem and came out 
against the change advocated above. ( 4 ) The Committee pointed out 
t hat the judge who is presiding will be in the best situation to 
deal with the incident as having seen the incident himself or 
having it directly reported to him. They also thought the threat 
of irrunediate punishment is also a more effective deterrent than a 
threat to refer a case elsewhere. There was also the problem of 
the availability of a s e cond judge in country areas. The Committee 
al so examined the alte rnative suggestion that the courts should 
have the option to direct proceedings be taken before another judge. 
Th is was rejected as well. A judge could well be open to 
c riticism for the way he exercised this option. 
The Phillimore Report recommended a much more limited reform -
a period of delay should be interposed between the determinati_on 
o f the issue of contempt and the imposition of the penalty. The 
court would have power to remand in custody pending sentence and 
l egal representation would be required for a hearing in mitigation 
( 1) p. 30-32 
(2) ibid 31 
( 3) p. 376-377 
(4) Paras. 30 - 31 
(1) 
of sentence. This proposal is probably more suited to the 
New Zealand situation. Often there will be only one judge in a town 
and there would be considerable delay and inconvenience in 
obtaining another before the matter could be adjudicated if the 
Justice Report reform were adopted. Referral to another judge 
could be made optional but this has the difficulties already 
mentioned. 
(1) Para. 33 cf. (1975) Cr. L.R. 130 where the limited nature of 
the reform is criticised. 
PART V 
REFORM OF TEE MODES OF PUNISHMENT FOR 
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONTEMPT 
A. The Methods of Punishment for Criminal and Civil Contempt 
It is not proposed to deal at length with this topic but just 
to mention the various means of punishment available to a court. (l) 
In criminal contempt cases, a court may either imprison without 
limit upon attachment or cornrnittal~ 2 ) fine the conternnor without 
1 .. t( 3 ) . . f dbh. (4 ) imi , require a security or goo e aviour or grant an 
injunction to restrain the repetition of an act of contempt or to 
prevent a contempt being committed. (5 ) The court has the further 
sanction of costs. ( 6 ) It may also give what is in effect a 
suspended sentence. (7 ) 
In civil contempt cases the court has most of the remedies 
mentioned above in connection with criminai contempt and there 
is a further remedy available. It may imprison without limit upon 
. ( 8 ) f" . h 1· ·t ( 9 ) committal or attachment, ine wit out imi , or grant an 
. . . . h . . t . t. f t t ( lO) inJunction to restraint e commission or repe i ion o a con emp. 
(1) For a full account see Borrie & Lowe 277 - 283 (Criminal Contempt); 341 - 367 (Civil Contempt). Also Halsbury (4th Ed.) Vol. 9 para 97 - 100 (Criminal Contempt) 101 - 105 (Civil Contempt) 
(2) Borrie & Lowe 277; Halsbury Vol. 9 (4th Ed.) para 97 
(3) Borrie & Lowe 282; Halsbury (supra) para. 99 
(4) Borrie & Lowe 283; Halsbury (supra) para. 99 
(5) Borrie & Lowe 283; Halsbury (supra) para. 100 
( 6) idem 
(7) cf. Lord Denning M.R. in Morris v Crown Office (1970) 2 Q.B. 114, 125. Also see Cook v Doyle (1946) N.Z.L.R. 398, 402 where a writ of attachment was ordered to lie in the office of the court to give time to a contemnor to comply. 
(8) Borrie & Lowe 350; Halsbury (supra) para. 101 
(9) ibid 355; para 103 
(10) ibid 357; para 104 
There is the same sanction of costs(l) but, in addition, there is 
the possibility of a writ of sequestration. (2 ) In the situation 
where a judgment for the payment of money is ordered, the appropriate 
procedure is committal under the Imprisonment for Debt Limitation 
Act 1908. 
B. The Present Rules Governing the Situations where Committal or 
Attachment is the Appropriate Remedy 
(i) The English Background 
The procedure by which a contemnor is imprisoned today have 
evolved from the courts' inherent powers to regulate their 
own process and proceedings. ( 3 ) The power of the court to imprison 
for contempt and the procedure by which this is done are both 
exercises of the Inherent Jurisdiction. 
Before Rules of Court were introduced under the English 
Judicature Acts, the law relating to the applicability of committal 
and attachment to a given situation was clearly settled. In cases 
of civil contempt, committal was the proper remedy for breach of an 
order to abstain from doing an act. On the other hand, attachment 
was the appropriate remedy to enforce an order that someone do a 
particular act. ( 4 ) Under the old practice attachment was issued 
as ordinary civil process on the application of the party interested! 5 ) 
(1) ibid 358; para. 104 
(2) See R.S.C. Ord. 45; Halsbury (4th Ed.) Vol 9 Para. 102; 
Borrie & Lowe 343 - 350 
(3) See Master Jacob: The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 
Current Legal Problems (1970) 23, 32 
(4) D v A & Co. (1900) 1 Ch. 484, 487 per Cozens-Hardy J. 
Mr. Registrar Lavie's Memorandum in In Re Evans, Evans v Noton 
(1893) 1 Ch. 252, 260 n. Harvey v Harvey (1884) 26 Ch. D. 644, 
654 per Chitty J. 
(5) Harvey v Harvey (1884) 26 Ch. D. 644, 654 per Chitty J. 
( 
It issued as a matter of course without any order of the court upon 
production of the order sought to be enforced. (l) 
In criminal contempt cases, while committal rather than 
attachment was the absolutely correct remedy, it was open to the 
person aggrieved to ask for attachment rather than committal under 
the old practice, as attachment was considered less than committal. (2 ) 
Consequently, attachment was regarded as an alternative remedy in 
cases of criminal contempt. 
There were other particular rules concerning a number of 
special situations. Thus, it was held that committal and not 
attachment was the appropriate remedy where there was a breach of an 
undertaking. (3 ) This situation did not fall within the general 
rule mentioned above which served to determine which remedy was 
available in cases of civil contempt, as there was no order that 
something was or was not to be done. Another special situation 
was when a sheriff failed to return a writ of attachment or bring 
in the person sought to be imprisoned after notice to do so. Here 
th . d . 1 ( 4 ) I h ld 1 b e appropriate reme y was committa. t sou a so e 
mentioned that in 1869 the Debtors Act (U.K.) was passed 
restricting imprisonment for debt and providing a statutory committal 
procedure for non payment of judgments ordering the payment of a sum 
of money. 
The process by which committal and attachment were effected 
differed. Attachment was directed to the sheriff who lodged the 
contemnor in the (county) goal. Committal was executed by the 
(1) Mr. Registrar Lavie's Memorandum (1893) 1 Ch. 252, 261 n. 
(2) ibid 260 n. - 261 n. 
(3) See D v A & Co. (1900) 1 Ch. 484; 488 - 489 
(4) Harvey v Harvey (1884) 26 Ch. D. 644 
( 
tipstaff of the court who brought the conternnor up to the court 
prison (Holloway). 
With the Judicature Acts corning into existence in the United 
Kingdom, the Rules of Court made under these acts altered the 
existing practice in two important respects. Firstly, by 
Order XLII Rule 7 it was provided that a judgrnent or order 
requiring a person to do an act other than the payment of a sum 
of money or to abstain from doing anything may be enforced by 
committal or attachment. (l) This did not affect cases of criminal 
contempt as Order XLII Rule 7 only applied where there was an order 
or judgrnent to be enforced. Nor did it apply to breaches of 
undertaking. 
The other innovation was effected by Order XLIV Rule 2, by 
which it was provided that no writ of attachment shall be issued 
without leave to be applied for on notice to the party against 
whom attachment is to be issued. (2 ) As a result, there was some 
difficulty in determining whether in any particular case personal 
service was required. Before Order XLIV Rule 2 came into force, 
attachment was issued as a matter of course without any order of the 
court. The procedure under committal differed. An order for 
committal was made by the court and the notice of motion had to 
( 3) be served personally on the conternnor. Now under the Rules of 
Court, leave of the court was required for the issue of attachment 
and the motion was to be made upon notice. The question arose 





See Mr. Registrar Lavie's Memorandum 
ibid 261 n. 
idem 
( 18 9 3) 1 Ch. 2 6 0 n. 
( 18 7 7 ) 5 Ch. D. 511. See also In Re Salarnan (an infant) (1923) 
N.Z.L.R. 50 
it was held by Jessel M.R. that personal service was not required and, therefore, service on a solicitor was sufficient. 
This decision still left one area of the law uncertain. A writ of attachment could not be issued when previously committal had been the only remedy. Personal service had always been required for committal because a judicial determination was required on the 
question whether what had been done was a breach of the order. (l) Mr. Registrar Lavie in his Memorandum{ 2 ) was of the opinion that the obligation of personal service could not be avoided merely by the expedient of:-
"applying for an attachment instead of a committal in a case 
where committal was the remedy before the Judicature Act." 
Thus, a motion for leave to issue attachment did not require to be served personally if before the Judicature Act it could have been issued without leave. Where committal upon the personal 
service of a notice or motion was previously the appropriate 
remedy before the Judicature Act then personal service of the motion for leave to issue attachment was required. 
(ii) The New Zealand Background 
The twofold nature of the New Zealand Supreme Court Contempt jurisdiction has already been discussed. ( 3 ) By successive 
enactments all the powers of the Superior Courts of Record at 
Westminster were conferred upon the Supreme Court here. This 
included the power to commit for contempt and the procedure by which a contemnor is imprisoned for his contempt. The Supreme Court is also 
(1) Mr. Registrar Lavie's Memorandum (1893) 1 Ch. 261 n. 
(2) ibid 261 n. - 262 n. The memorandum was approved by Bowen L.J. at ( 19 6 3 ) 1 Ch . 2 6 6 
(3) Part IIA ante 
endowed with inherent powers by virtue of its creation:-
" •.. the essential characteristic of a superior court of 
law necessarily involves that it should be invested with a 
power to maintain its authority and to prevent its process 
being obstructed and abused ... The jurisdiction which is 
inherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to 
fulfil itself as a court of law." ( 1) 
Thus, the New Zealand Supreme Court could have adopted its 
own procedure to imprison contemnors in the exercise of its 
inherent powers. This did not, in fact, happen and procedure here 
was based upon the English practice. Before the enactment of the 
Supreme Court Act 1882, the second schedule of which contained 
the precursor of the present Code of Civil Procedure, there had 
been a variety of provisions empowering the making of rules to 
govern procedure. Section 23 of the Supreme Court Ordinance 1841 (2 ) 
empowered the Judges of the Supreme Court to make rules governing 
the procedure of the Supreme Court. This Ordinance was replaced 
by the Supreme Court Ordinance 1844. ( 3 ) Section 25 gave a power 
to make rules subject to the confirmation of the Governor in 
Council. Under this power, rules were drawn up and confirmed in 
' ( 4) an ordinance of the same year. This did not make specific 
mention of contempt proceedings but after Rule 75 of these Rules 





"In all matters of practice not expressly provided for by 
the Rules for the time being of the Supreme Court, the practice 
of Her Majesty's Superior Courts at Westminster shall be 
followed so far as the same shall be applicable to the 
Master I.H. Jacob: The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 
Current Legal Problems (1970) p. 27 
4 Viet. (Session II No. 1) 
7 Viet. (Session III No. 1) 
8 Viet. (Session IV No. 1) 
( 
to the constitution of the court and consistent with the laws 
and circumstances of the Colony." 
There was a further ordinance in 1846 which confirmed further 
rules of court but once again did not touch upon contempt procedure. 
The incorporation of English procedure caused problems as each of 
the Superior Courts of Westminster had its own practice. In 1856 an 
( 1) 'Act for Regulating the Procedure of the Supreme Court' was passed. 
This provided for 'General Rules of Procedure' set out in a Schedule to the Act( 2 ) and revoked most previous Rules. ( 3 ) By section 3 
it was provided that the judges of the Supreme Court were empowered to make rules subject to the confirmation by the Governor in Council. 
In 1856 the Act was repealed by the Supreme Court Act of 1860, but 
the second schedule to the latter Act continued in force the Rules 
set out in the schedule to the 1856 Act. The second schedule to the 
1860 Supreme Court Act also confirmed the "Regulae Generales" of 
May 1859 - made by the Judges of the Supreme Court and confirmed 
by the Governor in Council. 
In the "Regulae Generales" there were (semble) the first 
references to contempt proceedings. (4 ) Rule 563 provided that 
as far as proceedings for writs of attachment and habeas corpus 
were concerned, the English Procedure shall be followed as far 
as it was applicable to New Zealand. Rule 563 did not mention 
procedure upon committal. Rule 455 provided that attachment may 
be issued to enforce an injunction. This provision contained a 
reference to the Common Law Procedure Aflendment Act 1845( 5 ) which 
was an amendment to the Common Law Procedure Act 1852. The purpose of 
(1) 19 & 20 Viet. (Session 1 No. 15) 
(2) See section 1. The writer has not been able to find the schedule printed in any compilation. 
(3) Section 2 
(4) See note 2 ante 
(5) 17 & 18 Viet. c. 125 
( 
the relevant parts of the 1854 Act was to provide for the exercise 
of the equitable remedies in the Courts of Common Law. Sections 81 
and 82, which were the basis of Rule 455 were concerned with the 
issue of attachment for breach of injunction in Common Law Courts. 
Such a provision was not necessary in New Zealand where there was 
a unified court structure and it is difficult to visualise the 
exact reason for its introduction into New Zealand law. 
Committal was again not mentioned in the 'Regulae Generales' 
but it could have been exercised in the inherent jurisdiction of 
the court, as actually happened. (l) 
(iii) Procedure in Civil Contempt Cases Today. 
The Second Schedule to the Supreme Court Act 1882 enacted a new 
code of civil procedure. This contained the same rules dealing with 
attachment( 2 ) as appear in the present code of civil procedure. For 
this reason it is not proposed to discuss the 1882 code. 
Rule 165 provides that non compliance with any order to answer 
interrogatories or for discovery or inspection of documents shall 
render the party liable to attachment. Rule 166 deals with the mode 
of service of the original order and Rule 167 imposes liability for 
attachment on a solicitor who neglects without reasonable cause to 
give notice to a client of such an order. Rule 208 imposes liability 
(1) See Parker v Dodson (1914) 33 N.Z.L.R. 1313 
(2) Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, Rules 165 - 167, 330, 378, 379, 386, 465 
( 
to attachment on any person disobeying an order to appear to give 
evidence after refusing to swear an affidavit. 
The main body of Rules that are relevant for present purposes, 
come under Part V of the Code which concerns writs of execution. 
Rule 336 provides that a judgment{l) may be enforced (inter alia) 
by attachment. Rules 336 - 361 deal generally with writs of 
execution. Rules 384 and 385 are concerned with the consequences 
following from the issue of a writ of attachment. The most 
important provision is Rule 392:-
"Where by any judgment of the court a party is ordered to do or 
abstain from doing any act not being the payment of a sum of 
money recovered in an action for debt or damages by any judgment 
of the court, and fails to obey such judgment, the party 
entitled to the benefit of the judgment may, by leave of the 
court or a judge, issue a writ of attachment. Notice of the 
application for leave to issue such writ shall be served on 
the party against whom it is intended to issue the writ." 
This rule brings into force some of the changes to contempt 
procedure which had been effected in England by the Rules made 
under the Judicature Acts. (2 ) As already mentioned, under the old 
procedure a person was corrunitted for doing what he ought not to do 
and was attached for doing what he was ordered not to do. (3 ) 
Order XLII Rule 7 modified this in England by providing that 
attachment and corrunittal were both to be available in the situation 
mentioned above except where the order was for the payment of money. ( 4 ) 
(1) which includes an order (see Rule 348) 
(2) See Order XLII Rule 7 and XLIV Rule 2 mentioned in Mr. Registrar 
Lavie's Memorandum (1993) 1 Ch. 252, 260 - 61 n. 
(3) ibid 260 n. 
(4) This was governed by the special procedure under the Debtors 
Act 18 6 9 ( U . K . ) 
( 
Rule 392 is an interesting variation upon the English reforms. It provides that where a person is by a judgment ordered to do or 
abstain from doing an act other than an order for the payment of 
a sum of money, attachment may be issued with the leave of a judge. 
The true interpretation of this Rule is a matter of some doubt. It probably means that attachment is now available as an alternative in situations where committal was previously the correct remedy. 
Rule 392 does not expressly exclude the inherent jurisdiction to 
entertain committal proceedings and the wording of the Rule is 
not mandatory. {l) It is submitted that Rule 392 must be taken to 
modify previous practice as to the availability of attachment 
but not to affect the previous law as to the applicability of 
committal to enforce judgments or orders. Notwithstanding its 
absence from the Code of Civil Procedure, committal is available 
for breach of an order to abstain from an act in the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court and has, in fact, been invoked. ( 2 ) Likewise the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to issue a writ of sequestration. ( 3 ) It is well established law that the inherent 
jurisdiction should not be taken to be limited by Rules of Court unless it is abrogated in clear terms. In Balogh v Crown Court ( 4 ) 
Stephenson L.J. said:-
"I do not accept the arguement that the limits of the power of a 
Superior court to imprison a contemnor are defined or restricted 
by the Rules of the Supreme Court. They should disclose but 
(1) cf. Horton Ltd. v Horton (1924) G.L.R. 340 
(2) See Parker v Dodson (1914) 33 N.Z.L.R. 1313 
(3) See Borrie & Lowe 343 et seq. For an Australian example see Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v Morgan (1965) 39 A.L.J.R. 32 ( 4 ) ( 19 7 4 ) 3 Al 1 E . R . 2 8 3 
may disguise its true nature and extent, and if they misunderstand 
it they may need to be revised." (l) 
Master Jacob made a similar comment:- (2) 
"The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be exercised in any 
given case notwithstanding that there are Rules of Court 
governing the circumstances of the case. The powers conferred by 
Rules of Court are generally speaking additional to and not in 
substitution of powers arising out of the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court." 
One further point should be mentioned in connection with Rule 392. 
Mr. Registrar Lavie in his Memorandum( 3 ) was of the opinion that in 
England the obligation of personal service of a motion for committal 
could not be got around by the expedient of applying for attachment 
unde r Order XLII Rule 7 ·when committal was the correct remedy prior 
to the Judicature Acts. Rul e 392 only mentions attachment but 
(mutatis muta ndis) the vie w· of Mr. Registrar Lavie may still be 
app licable to New Zealand. The r e i s n o decision on this point in 
connection with Rule 392. It was discussed in Horton v Horton( 4 ) 
which concerned Rule 475 and which receives consideration in later 
paragraphs. Subject to any possible relevance of this case to the 
procedure under Rule 392, it would seem likely that a New Zealand 
court would follow the view of Mr. Registrar Lavie in the lights 
of the adoption of other aspects of English procedure here. In 
Parker v Dodson( 5 ) the English practice was followed with the result 
(1) ibid 292 
(2) The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, Current Legal Problems 
(1970) 23, 25 
( 3 ) ( 18 9 3 ) 1 Ch . 2 5 2 ; 2 6 1 n • - 2 6 2 n • 
(4 ) (1924) G.L.R. 340 
(5) (1914) 33 N.Z.L.R. 131] 
that a motion for committal had to be served personally on the 
contemnors. In Re Salaman (an infant) (l) a writ of attachment 
was issued to enforce an order embodied in a writ of habeas corpus. 
Reed J. followed Browning v Sabin( 2 ) and held that personal service 
upon the contemnor was not necessary. Neither of the last two 
mentioned cases involved situations where attachment was not the 
appropriate remedy under pre 1882 procedure. The point still 
awaits affirmative decision. 
The relationship between the courts' inherent jurisdiction 
and the Code of Civil Procedure is of special importance in 
connection with the punishment for disobedience to the writs of . . . (3) d (4) h'b' . (5) (6) d 1nJunct1on, man amus, pro 1 1t1on, quo warranto an 
certiorari. (7 ) Rule 475 states:-
"Any person disobeying any order made under the preceding 
Rules 461 to 474 shall be liable to attachment." 
The meaning of this Rule was considered by Stout C.J. in Horton v 
Horton. (8 ) This case involved a motion for the issue of a writ of 
attachment for breach of an injunction. Under the prevailing 
practice before the Judicature Acts in England and the 1882 
Code of Civil Procedure in New Zealand, committal would have been 
the appropriate remedy to enforce an injunction not to do a particular 
act. Moreover, personal service would be required. In Horton v Horton 
the procedure laid down in Rule 475 was followed and leave to issue 
(1) ( 19 2 3) N.Z.L.R. 16 
( 2) (1877) 5 Ch. D. 511 
( 3) Rule 462 
( 4) Rule 461 
( 5) Rule 463 
( 6) Rule 464 
( 7) Rule 466, 466A 
( 8) (1924) G.L.R. 340 
( 
attachment was sought. At the hearing of the motion it was 
argued (inter alia) that the notice of motion should have been 
served personally and that, consequently, service upon a solicitor 
pursuant to Rule 586 was not sufficient. (l) 
Counsel for the respondent based his submission( 2 ) upon the 
view put forward in Mr. Registrar Lavie's Memorandum that if 
committal was the appropriate remedy before the Judicature Acts 
the obligation for personal service could not be avoided simply 
by applying for attachment. Stout C.J. rejected counsel's submissions. 
"The Memorandum of the Registrar was to the effect that if 
committal was the proper remedy there must be personal service 
and that the obligation of personal service could not be got 
rid of merely by applying for an attachment. Can it be said, 
however, that in this case the proper order to ask for was 
committal? In my opinion that cannot be said. This rule is 
a special provision in our Code of Civil Procedure, and the 
penalty mentioned, "attachment" is all that can be asked for. 
We cannot read into our Code the English Rules or part of the 
Rules of the English Court of Chancery. We are bound by our 
own procedure." ( 3) 
Later on he continued:-
"If, then, there could have been no motion for committal 
the reason for personal service was not present. It is not 
necessary to cite the many English cases which show that in 
motions for attachment personal service is not required. Our 
Rule 586 shows how service on a "party" can be effected, and 
it has been obeyed. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 
(1) ibid 340 
(2) ibid 341 
(3) idem 
( 
notice of motion was properly served ..• " (1) 
The judgment of Stout C.J. raises a number of important issues. 
There is, firstly, the view expressed by him as to the relevance of 
the English Rules of Procedure in New Zealand. It is difficult to 
give one's assent to his conclusions upon this matter. While one can 
agree with Stout C.J. that the English Rules of Court have no force 
here in New Zealand and that we cannot 'read in' the English Rules 
of Court, the writer respectfully doubts Stout C.J.'s further 
statement that committal was not a 'proper' remedy to be asked for. 
Unless the inherent jurisdiction is excluded, it is available to 
enforce a negative injunction as existed in Horton Ltd. v Horton. ( 2 ) 
Stout C.J. did not mention the existence of the inherent jurisdiction; 
his conclusion as to what was the 'proper' remedy was based solely on 
the Code of Civil Procedure. In accordance with Mr. Registrar Lavie's 
Memorandum, the correct method of determining whether personal 
service of a motion for leave to issue attachment is required is 
to look at the procedure before the enactment of the Judicature Acts. 
The view has earlier been expressed that the old distinctions between 
committal and attachment as modified by the Rules of Court( 3 ) have 
been adopted in New Zealand and still are existing at present. 
Assuming this to be so, the committal was an appropriate remedy 
in this case unless excluded by some clear statutory provision. This 
result does not depend upon the Rules of Court but upon the inherent 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
The question then arises whether Rule 475 has excluded the 
. h . . d. . ( 4 ) Th R 1 f C t 11 t k t 1n erent Juris iction. e u es o our are norma y a en o 
be an addition to the inherent jurisdiction and not in substitution 
(1) idem 
(2) (1924) G.L.R. 340 
(3) e.g. by Rule 392 
(4) This issue was not raised in Horton Ltd. v Horton (supra) 
( 
for it. (l) The last words of Rule 475 - "shall be liable to 
attachment" - are also used in Rules 165 and 167. In Rule 336 
it is stated that judgments 'may' be enforced by (inter alia) 
attachment and by Rule 392, a writ of attachment may be issued by leave 
of the court in the circumstances enumerated there. The writer 
submits that the difference of wording is not significant and that 
the inherent jurisdiction is not excluded by Rules 165, 167 and 475. 
The consequence of this would be that Rule 475 should be considered 
as thereby modifying the inherent jurisdiction by making attachment 
available in a wider variety of circumstances. The matter is not 
free from doubt, but in the absence of any judicial authority, the 
writer prefers an interpretation that makes Rule 475 an addition to 
the inherent jurisdiction rather than a substitute for it. 
It remains to mention the procedure for enforcing the payment 
of a sum of money recovered in an action for debt or damage by 
any judgment of the court. This procedure is covered by the 
Imprisonment for Debt Limitation Act 1908, a detailed consideration 
of which is outside the scope of this paper. It should, however, 
be mentioned that Rules 385H - 385L of the Code of Civil Procedure 
regulate proceedings under that Act. 
(iv) Procedure in Criminal Contempt Cases Today 
Rule 605 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that nothing in 
the foregoing Rules of the Code shall affect existing practice or 
procedure in criminal proceedings or for an application for Habeas 
Corpus. Proceedings for criminal contempt are of a criminal nature. 
(1) Master Jacob: The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court; Current 
Legal Problems (1970) p. 25 
I • 
( 
Rule 606 provides that the practice, proceeding and procedure in the 
Supreme Court on all informations and other criminal proceedings 
except those for which the offender may be proceeded against by 
indictment shall be the same as in England, so far as the English 
practice, pleading and procedure are applicable to New Zealand and 
consistent with any other rules of the Supreme Court and the laws 
of New Zealand. 
The interpretation of Rule 606 causes considerable difficulty. 
If the wording is taken literally, it would seem to imply that the 
United Kingdom Rules of the Supreme Court dealing with criminal 
contempt are incorporated into New Zealand law in the absence of 
local provisions. In England considerable changes were made to the 
procedure for both criminal and civil contempt by R.S.C. Order 52. 
This contains many worth while reforms but most would be startled 
if it was suggested that, at least as far as criminal contempt 
proceedings were concerned, the provisions of R.S.C. Order 52 were 
part of New Zealand law. In civil proceedings there are pre-
existing provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure which would be 
inconsistent with R.S.C. Order 52. The problems associated with 
Rule 606 highlight the need for reform in this area. Prior to 
leaving the present topic, however, it should be mentioned that 
in criminal contempt cases there is no doubt that the English 
practice arising from the inherent jurisdiction is followed. Both 
in England and New Zealand attachment has always been an alternative 
to committal. R.S.C. Order 52 has practically made attachment 
obsolete in all cases of contempt, but the two distinct means of 
proceeding remain as equally used alternatives in New Zealand. 
Normally both attachment and committal are sought. (l) 
(1) e.g. Adams v Walsh (1963) N.Z.L.R. 158; A.G. v Blomfield (1913) 33 N.Z.L . R. 545. In Morris v Wellington City (1961) N.Z.L.R. 1038 only attachment was applied for. 
( 
c. REFORM OF THE RULES OF COURT 
Many of the reforms that have been suggested in this paper 
may be best put into effect by being incorporated into a comprehensive 
codification of procedure in contempt cases. 
In addition to the question of the availability of committal/ 
attachment in any particular situation and the necessity for personal 
service, there are other reforms that could with advantage be 
included in any such codification. Among these are the rights to 
give oral evidence in one's defence, the trial of disputed questions, 
some precise statement of the charges of contempt, power to discharge 
a person from custody before the term of sentence expires in all cases 
of contempt and specific power to make an order for discharge 
conditional upon payment of costs in both civil and criminal 
situations. If the process of certification to another judge was 
adopted when there is a contempt in the face of the court, the 
procedure for this could also be included. 
In 1965 contempt procedure was comprehensively modified in the 
United Kingdom by R.S.C. Order 52. (l) This provision sought to 
overcome many of the difficulties that are still present in the 
New Zealand law as seen above. Some parts of R.S.C. Order 52 are 
not relevant as they deal with the question of which division of 
the High Court should hear a particular application~ 2 ) but many other 
parts of R.S.C. Order 52 could well be considered in New Zealand Reform:-
(1) Order 52 Rule 1(1) provides that the power of the High Court or 
Court of Appeal to commit for contempt may be exercised by committal. 
(1) See Appendix III 
(2) e.g. Order 52 Rule (1) (2) 
( 
This does not abolish attachment but, in effect, makes it 
obsolete. In New Zealand, attachment has had greater 
prominence in the civil contempt field because it is the only 
remedy mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also 
available in a wider variety of circumstances - committal being 
hampered by the old rules as to its availability in civil cases. 
In criminal cases both attachment and cornnittal are equally 
favoured. The alternative avenues of reform are either to make 
committal or attachment equally applicable in all cases of 
contempt or adopt one or the other as the basic remedy as has 
been done in England. 
(2) Before an application for an order of committal can be made in 
the Queen's Bench Division in accordance with Order 52 Rule (1) (2) 
leave to make that application must be applied for. Such a 
requirement would be a check upon individuals who seek to bring 
contempt proceedings. The Phillimore Committee regarded it as 
an additional safeguard to the necessity of notifying the 
Attorney-General where criminal contempt proceedings are 
contemplated(l) and the writer is of the opinion that such a 
reform could be adopted here. 
(3) A notice of motion to which the Code of Civil Procedure applies 
must in accordance with Rule 399 be filed three clear days 
before the day named for hearing. In contempt cases to which the 
Code does not apply, there is no minimum requirement laid down at 
all. Under Order 52 Rule 3(1) there must be eight clear days 
between service and the date named for the hearing. As the 
penalties that can be imposed include imprisonment, it would seem 
desirable that a contemnor be given adaquate time to prepare his 
(1) Para. 187 See also Part III ante. 
( 
case. Admittedly this lack of a similar provision has not led 
to any reported case of abuse but, nevertheless, it is 
submitted that a similar provision should be enacted here. 
(4) R.S.C. Order 52 provides for personal service in all cases of contempt. (l) This is not the position in New Zealand at the 
present time. A similar provision to those contained in 
R.S.C. Order 52 is contained in both New South Wales Supreme 
Court Rules and the High Court of Australia Rules. (2 ) The 
seriousness of contempt proceedings would again justify a 
similar provision here. 
(5) R.S.C. Order 52 provides for the hearing of Committal Orders in · ( 3 ) f h . . . d h private. Some o t e situations mentione t ere are 
covered by the inherent jurisdiction, ( 4 ) but consideration should be given to the conferment of an enlarged jurisdiction in 
terms similar to R.S.C. Order 52 Rule 6(1). It should be 
mentioned, however, that this provision does not cover the 
mere suppression of a name, but only deals with in camera 
hearings. 
(6 ) Except with the leave of the court no grounds shall be relied 
upon unless they are set out in the notice of motion or in the 
statement which must accompany the application for leave to apply for an order of committal. (5 ) At present, Rule 402 of the Code 
achieves a similar result in the case of attachment for civil 
contempt but other situations are not covered. Consideration 
(1) R.S.C. Order 52 Rules 3(3) and 4(2) 
(2 ) R.S.C. (N.S.W.) Part 55 Division 3 Rule 9 (4th Schedule to Supreme Court Act 1970). High Court Rules Order 56 Rule 4 
(3 ) Order 52 Rule 6(1) and (2) 
(4 ) Scott v Scott (1913) A.C. 417 
(5 ) See Order 52 rule 6 (3) 
r 
should be given to the adoption of general provision covering 
all contempt proceedings. 
(7) While evidence is mainly by affidavit, a person sought to be 
committed can give oral evidence on his own behalf if he wishes 
to do so. {l) Such a right would not appear to exist at present 
in New Zealand. 
(8) The courts are given power to suspend the execution of a committal 
order. (2 ) This power is already exercisable at Common Law{ 3 ) 
but a specific provision is probably desirable. The equivalent 
N.S.W. rule{ 4 ) allows for suspension of all forms of punishment 
upon the making of an order for punishment for contempt. 
(9) Express power to discharge a person committed to prison is given. (5 ) 
Previously, only in cases of civil contempt could a court order 
discharge before the expiry of the fixed term. In the N.S.W. 
High Court Rules( 6 ) the power to discharge is expressly mentioned 
to be exercisable before the expiry of a fixed term unlike the 
more general English Rule. 
The main reforms achieved by R.S.C. Order 52 have now been 
mentioned. In Australia there has been an attempt in both the High 
Court Rules and N.S.W. Supreme Court Rules to draw up a detailed 
procedural code for contempt proceedings. Some of their provisions 
have already been discussed above. 
(1) Order 52 Rule 6(4); see also R.S.C. (N.S.W.) Part 55 Div. 3 
Rule 8(2) 
(2) Order 52 Rule 7 
(3) See Lord Denning in Morris v Crown Office (1970) 2 Q.B. 114, 125 
(4) R.S.C. (N.S.W.) Part 55 Div. 4 Rule 13(3) 
(5) R.S.C. Ord 52 Rule 8 (1) 
(6) Part 55 Div. 4 Rule 14 
Unlike the United Kingdom Rules, the Australian provisions 
also deal with the procedure to punish a contempt in the face of 
the court. The two sets of Australian provisions are not identical 
in dealing either with this matter or with others. As the N.S.W. 
Supreme Court Rules are based on the earlier High Court Rules the 
former will primarily be discussed. 
Division 2 of Part 55 of the N.S.W. Rules deals with the 
jurisdiction to punish contempts 'in the face or hearing of the 
court'. In the light of Balogh v Crown Court(l) this jurisdiction 
is probably equivalent with what is regarded at Common Law as 
contempt in the face of the court. Where such a contempt is alleged 
or appears to the court upon its own view it can order that the 
contemnor be brought before the court or issue a warrant for his 
arrest. <2 ) There is little evidence of whether courts exercised 
equivalent powers in reliance on the inherent jurisdiction. 
Certainly the Australian provision is useful. In New Zealand a 
similar result can be achieved under section 56C of the Judicature 
Act and section 401(1) of the Crimes Act. By virtue of these 
provisions a Judge can order a conternnor to be taken into custody 
and retained until the rising of the court . 
. d ( 3) The N.S.W. Rules go on to prov1 e 
is before the court, the court shall:-
that once a conternnor 
"(a) cause him to be informed orally of the contempt with which 
he is charged; 
(b) require him to make his defence to the charge; 
(c) after hearing him, determine the matter of the charge and 
(d) make an order for the punishment or discharge of the conternnor. 
(1) (1974) 3 All E.R. 283 
(2) Part 55 Div. 2 Rule 2(a) - (b) 
(3) Div. 2 Rule 3 
( 
The above provides a limited procedural code which adds little 
to the pre-existing law as set out in In Re Pollard. (l) It does not 
confer a right to legal representation nor does it interpose a period 
of delay between the determination of the charge and sentencing 
both of which reforms were advocated by the Phillimore Committee. (2 ) 
While a N.S.W. court is not required to delay sentencing, it is 
clear that they can do so if they think fit. Division 2 rule 4 
of Part 55 provides that the court may, pending the disposal of the 
charge, keep the contemnor in custody or direct that he be 
released in which case the court may require security for his 
appearance. ( 3 ) 
In the case of 'proceedings or motion' for punishrnent( 4 ) 
the N.S.W. rules make a number of innovations. Where the 
contempt is made in connection with proceedings in the court, the 
I 1 ' ' f ' h I ( 5 ) ' 11 d t, ( 6 ) app ication or puni s ment is norma y ma e upon rno ion. 
Where the contempt is not committed in connection with proceedings 
i n court, the proceeding s for contenpt are to be commenced by 
s ummons(?) with whic h a s t a tenent of charge is filed. (S) Such a 
s tatement of charge al so ha s to be filed when proceedings are 
commenced by moti on. Th e writer doubts whether the statement 
of charge would b e of a ny greater assistance to a contemnor than 
t he grounds ·which p re s e ntly have to be stated in a notice of motion. 
As already mentione d, the notice of motion or summons and the 
s tatement of charge and affidavits must be served personally upon 
t he contemnor. (9 ) 
(1) (1869) L.R. 2 P.C. 106. See Part IVB ante 
(2) See Paras. 32 - 33 See also Part IVB ante 
(3) Part 55 Div. 2 Rule 4 
(4) See Part 55 Div 3 Rule 6 
(5) This is a N.S.tv. innovation. Under Order 56 of the High Court 
Rules committal is the appropriate remedy. 
(6) Part 55 Div 3 Rule 6(1) 
(7) Rule 6 (2) 
(8) Part 55 Div 3 Rule 7 
(9) Part 55 Div 3 Rule 8 
( 
Rule 10 of Part 55 Div. 3 provides for the arrest for a 
conternnor when it is thought that he is likely to abscond while 
a notice of motion or proceeding by su:mr:!ons are pending. This 
again is an area in which there is a complete lack of authority 
a s to the ability of the inherent jurisdiction to deal with the 
situation. Prima facie it seems that the court does not have a 
general power to imprison unless there is an order for committal or 
attachment in force. If this is so, then Rule 10 is worthy of 
consideration for adoption in New Zealand, although it would not 
often be invoked. 
Rule 11 supplies an interesting alternative to present means 
by which proceedings for 'constructive contempts' (i.e. those not 
i n the face of the court) may be commenced. At present, proceedings 
may be commenced by e ither the Attorney-General or by an individual. 
Rule 11(1) provides that the court may direct the Registrar of the 
c ourt to apply by motion or p roce edings by surmnons for the 
punishment of the conter.1pt. In New Zealand the court only has 
power to initiate proceedings whe n the contempt is in the face of 
t he court. The write r doe s have one reservation about the N.S.W. 
provision - it is open to the same criticism that contempt in the 
f ace proceedings are. The judge or judges concerned seem to be 
prosecutors and adjudicators in their own cause albeit that the 
Registrar is the actual applicant. 
A large number of possible reforms have now been discussed. It 
i s hoped that when the Code of Civil Procedure is re-enacted, there 
will be a new approach taken to contempt procedure. If this is to be 
a chieved, the new provisions will have to cover both criminal and 
c ivil cases. Such is the case in both N.S.W. and in England. The 
writer does not see any obstacles against such a course being taken in 
New Zealand. 
PART VI 
THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CONTEMPTS - THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Traditionally the difference between civil and criminal contempts 
were explained by the differing roles ascribed to a court in each 
case. Disobedience to orders and judgments made in civil cases was 
regarded as primarily the concern of the party affected. The court 
acted as a 'mere ringholder' (l) between the parties and would use 
its civil contempt jurisdiction to coerce the other party to obey its 
judgment or order upon the application of the party; while in 
criminal contempt cases the jurisdiction was regarded as punitive. 
The essence of this approach is explained in Borrie & Lowe:-( 2 ) 
" ... The courts' jurisdiction in respect of criminal 
contempts is p e nal, the aim being to protect the public 
interest in ensuring that the administration of justice 
is duly protecte d. On the at.her hand, the courts 
jurisdiction in r esp e ct of civil contempts is primarily 
remedial, the basic object being to coerce the offender 
' b ' h I 'd t d ,.( 3 ) into o eying t e courts JU gmen or or er. 
However, as the learned authors go on to point out, there is a 
punitive element in even civil contempt cases as the law of contempt 
as a whole is designed to uphold the due administration of justice. ( 4 ) 
Thus, when there has been wilful disobedience to a court order, the 
court acts to remedy the breach but also to vindicate the court's 
(1) Phillimore Committee Report Para. 177 
(2) Page 310 
(3) See also Halsbury (4th Ed.) Vol. 9 Para 54 
(4) Borrie & Lowe 370; see also Australian Consolidated Press v 
Morgan (1965) 39 A.L.J.R. 32, 35 per Windeyer J. 
authority by penalising the person in breach. (l) Court orders( 2 ) 
involve an area which has caused special difficulty in classification 
in the past. (
3
) The courts have tended to treat the most flagrant 
breaches of court orders made in the course of civil proceedings as 
criminal contempts but it cannot be said that there has been any 
serious attempt to provide a workable classification. (4 ) With orders 
made in criminal cases, the courts have always regarded most of them 
as interfering with the course of justice in such a way that they 
should be stigmatised as criminal contempts. In the Attorney-General v 
Taylor & Edwards(
5
) it was never doubted that the breach of the order 
in that case involved a criminal contempt. Beattie J. in the Supreme 
Court held that a contempt was established not only because there was 
an interference with the administration of justice but also because 
the conduct of the respondents amounted to:-
" ... a clear and deliberate affront to the authority of the 
court calculated to depreciate its authority and, therefore, 
was a challenge to the rule of law." ( 6 ) 
There has been a considerable change of thinking as to the 
nature of the courts' role in contempt cases. The Phillimore 
Committee thought that the courts had a distinct interest in the 
active enforcement of their orders and recommended that the courts 
should have power of its own motion to act against a person who 
disobeys its order whenever the court thinks fit to do so. (7 ) This 
power would be especially useful in custody cases where the welfare 








Phonographic Performance Ltd. v Amusement Caterers (Peckham) Ltd. 
(1964) Ch. 195, 198 per Cross J. 
The writer is not referring to final orders and judgments here. 
e.g. Scott v Scott (1913) A.C. 417 
ibid 445 per Lord Loreburn 
(1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138 
ibid 143 - 144 
Para. 171 
Moreover, the distinctions have been substantially reduced 
by reforms in recent years. There is now an appeal in both civil 
and criminal contempt cases, although in New Zealand the right of 
appeal in criminal cases as conferred by section 384 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 is increasingly restrictive. Previously it was 
thought that there was no power to fine in civil contempt cases 
but the existence of such a power has recently been confirmed!l) 
The remaining distinctions are set out in the standard 
English works of reference. <2 > The Phillimore Corrunittee 
r ecommended that all distinctions be abolished{ 3 ) and cited 
Salmon L.J. in Jennison v Baker{ 4 ) :-
II contempts have sometimes been classified as criminal 
and civil contempts. I think that at any rate today this 
is an unhelpful and almost meaningless classification." 
It is not intended to deal with the committee's consideration of 
t he individual distinctions in detail, but briefly it recommended 
t he abolition of the special cases of privelege from arrest or 
committal for civil conternpt( 5 ) and the abolition of the power 
of a party to waive a contempt committed by the breach of a court 
order. (6 ) It next examined differences in sentencing procedure. 
At present, the normal practice is to commit a person until he obeys 
an order or judgment while a fixed term is imposed for criminal 
contempts. The Phillimore Committee recommended that sine die 
committals be abolished and that fixed terms be imposed in all cases. <7 
The Committee also called for the removal of certain restrictions 
(1) ibid 200 per Cross J. 
(2) Halsbury (4th Ed.) Vol.9 Para. 4; 
Harnan: Civil and Criminal Contempt 
(3) Para. 176 
(4) (1971) 2 Q.B. 52, 61 
(5) Para 170 
(6) Para 171 
(7 ) Para. 172 
Borrie & Lowe 373 - 374; 
of Court (1962) 25 M.L.R. 179 
r 
( 
upon the execution of attachment and committal orders in cases 
of civil contempt. At the moment, a sheriff or other officer of 
the court acting under a writ of attachment or order of committal 
in a criminal contempt situation may break down an outer door and 
( 1) probably can effect an arrest on a Sunday. It was thought that 
because of the criminal nature of the contempt process this power 
should be extended to all cases of contempt. (2 ) 
One distinction was not mentioned by the Committee. The writ 
of sequestration is not applicable to criminal contempt as it is a 
form of civil execution. (3 ) The purpose of a writ is to force a 
corporation into obedience to a court order. It is a purely 
remedial form of process and does not appear to be suited to the 
situation where it is sought mer,2ly to penalise a corpor ate 
contemnor. 
Finally, we may note that there is one distinction surviving 
in New Zealand which has been abolished in England. If a person 
is committed to prison for a fixed period for a criminal contempt 
the court did not have power to discharge him before the period 
expired. It is otherwise in the case of civil contempts. (4 ) 
The law has been changed in England by R.S.C. Order 52 rule 8(1) 
and now a court may order discharge before the expiry of a fixed 
term in all cases of contempt. 
(1) Halsbury (4th Ed.) Vol 9 Para 114; Borrie & Lowe 373 
(2) Para 173 
( 3) 
( 4) 
Borrie & Lowe 373 
Attorney-General v James (1962) 2 Q.B. 631 
r 
PART VII 
SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT FOR CONTEMPT 
A. Restriction of the Power to Fine and Imorison 
At present there is no limit upon the Supreme Court's power 
to fine or irr.prison except in the case of the statutory contempt 
jurisdiction. (l) There have been. suggestions from many quarters 
that some limitations upon penalties is desirable to bring contempt 
proceedings into line with the general civil law. (2 ) The Justice 
Report on Contempt of Court concluded that there was no positive 
advantage in fixing any limits. It is the writer's opinion that 
s ome limitation should be imposed on the power of imprison@ent. 
The Phillimore Committee r e commended a maximum of two years. ( 3 ) 
The Committee was influence d by the thinking that any offences 
warranting a heavier s e nte nce would normally be also crimes 
punishable on indictme nt and should be dealt with accordingly. Other 
offences have limit s i mpo sed and it is submitted the principle should 
be recognised h e r e . 
The case of finin g is more difficult. Sometime s with large 
c ompanies and trade unions only an extremely large sanction will be 
an adaquate deterre nt. Also the re is necessity to impose increasingly 
heavier penalties for continued disobedience. In one Canadian 
case a union was fined $25,000. (4 ) The proble m is of considera ble 
d ifficulty and it i s notewor thy that the Phillimor e Committee 
r ecommended no change in the law. (5 ) If some limit was fixed it may 
have to be so high as to be valueless. 
(1) e.g. section 401 Crime s Act; section 56C Judicature Act 





R. v United Fisherme n and Allie d Workers Union, Stavene s et al (1968) 65 D.L.R. (2 ed ) 220, 579 (on appeal to the British 
Columbia Court of Appe al 
Para 202 
r 
B. The Applicability of the Criminal Justice Act 1954 to Contempt 
Proceedings 
The Criminal Justice Act 1954 and amendments thereto lays down 
detailed provisions as to probation, young offenders, borstal 
training, preventive detention, parol, suspended sentences, the 
power to discharge without conviction and periodic detention. 
In Morris v Crown Office(l) the English Court of Appeal considered 
the application of the English Criminal Justice Acts to the power 
to imprison for contempt. 
A group of students had invaded a court and disrupted 
proceedings. Some were fined but most were imprisoned. On 
appeal it was argued that section 17(2) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1948 and section 39(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 had 
not been complied with by the judge. Section 17(2) is similar but 
not identical to section 14(1) of our Act. Section 39(3) is 
similar to part of section 41 combined with section 43A which was 
e nacted in 1967 and, p r e sumably, modelled upon the equivalent 
United Kingdom sec t ion. 
The Court of Ap pe a l held that these provisions were not 
applicable to a committal for contempt. Lord Denning M.R. first 
pointed out the provision s of section 17(2) had, in fact, been 
c omplied with. He then went on to deal with section 39(1) and (3). 
The words 'court', 'offe nce' and 'sentence of imprisonment' as 
u sed in the act; 2 ) whe n taken literally, apply to a court exercising 
c riminal contempt jurisdiction. (J) A court is defined as "any .. a· . . .. 1 ,,( 4 ) A .. 1 c ourt exercising Juris iction in crimina cases. cri~ina 
(1) (1970) 2 Q.B. 114 
(2) See sections 2(1), 14(1) and 43A. 
(3) (1970) 2 Q.B. 114, 123-124 
(4) Section 2(1) of the Judicature Act 1954 
r 
contempt is clearly a criminal offence and the punishment given 
was a sentence of imprisonment. However, Lord Denning decided 
upon a consideration of the scheme of the Act that the Legislature 
never intended section 39 to apply to committals for criminal 
contempt. Lord Denning based his view on the consideration that it 
would be impossible for a judge to follow up and enforce a 
suspended sentence - no power to do so is given to the High Court in 
England. It should be mentioned the equivalent provision in New 
Zealand (section 43A) deals with the sentencing procedure in a 
different way. Here the court is instructed not to sentence 
anyone to less than six months imprisonment unless no other way 
of dealing with the person is appropriate. In England an offender 
is given a suspended sentence(l) in the same circumstances which 
causes the problems mentioned above. 
The other members of the court were prepared to base their 
judgments upon other grounds. Davies L.J. said:-
" ... there are a number of provisions in the criminal law 
statutes, as I am willing to call them, which obviously 
have no application whatsoever to proceedings for contempt. 
Take probation: it would be quite impossible, I think, for a 
judge dealing with a case of contempt to make a probation 
order. Yet such a course is possible in all criminal cases 
Salmond L.J. (as he then was) was equally of the opinion that 
the power to commit for contempt is sui generis:-
"Although the point is by no means free from difficulty, I agree 
with My Lords that Parliament cannot be taken to have intended 
(1) cf. section 41 of the Judicature Act 1954 
(2) (1970) 2 Q.B. 114, 127 
11 ( 2) 
that this power should be fettered by the Criminal Justice 
Acts of 1948 and 1967. To my mind it is plain that 
Parlia~ent never intended these Acts to apply to proceedings 
such as these." (l) 
It is submitted that these observations apply with equal force 
to the Criminal Justice Act 1954. In Attorney-General v Taylor 
& Edwards(
2
) Beattie J. in the Supreme Court originally found 
Edwards guilty of contempt but discharged him under section 42 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1954 upon payment of $200 towards 
the cost of the proceedings. Then, in a later addendum to his 
judgment he said:-
"Since delivery of this oral judgment I have realised that 
in the case of Dr. Edwards the provisions of section 42 of 
the Criminal Justice Act may be inapplicable. I, therefore, 
delete any reference to that Act." ( 3 ) 
The better view would thus appear to be that the Criminal 
Justice Act 1954 does not have any application to contempt proceedings. 
The Phillimore Committee did not consider that the provisions of the 
English Criminal Justice Acts should apply to contempt proceedings. ( 4 ) 
The writer tends to agree but the matter is not of great 
importance in light of the inherent powers open to the court. The 
court is still able to give what amounts to a suspended sentence 
in contempt proceedings. As Lord Denning said in Morris v Crown 






II to give an immediate sentence or to postpone it, to commit 
ibid 129 
(1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. 138 
This passage, of course, does not appear in the reported judgment. 
Para. 203 
(1970) 2 Q.B. 114 
r 
to prison pending consideration of the sentence, to bind 
over to be of good behaviour and keep the peace and to 
bind over to come up for judgrnent if called upon."(l) 
c. Treatment of a Contemnor in Prison 
In the United Kingdom a person imprisoned for contempt is 
subject to special prison rules. (2 ) They are treated as 
unconvicted prisoners which gives them special priveleges. (3 ) 
In New Zealand the rules relating to unconvicted offenders are 
not applied to those adjudged to be guilty of contempts but 
Rule 166 of the Penal Institutions Regulations 1961 provides 
that contemnors shall be kept from other inmates as far as 
practicable. 
( 1) ibid 125 
(2) Prison Rules 1964 (S.I. 1964 No. 388) Rule 63. cf. Barrie & Lowe 283 
( 3) Barrie & Lowe 283. cf. Part V of the Penal Institutions Regulations 1961 (S.R. 1961/161) Rules 154 - 165 which give special priveleges to unconvicted prisoners. 
r 
PART VIII 
APPEALS FROM THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF 
CONTEMPT JURISDICTION 
This subject matter has had a very piecemeal and erratic 
history of reform. It is intended to look at existing appeal 
rights in New Zealand and the 1960 English legislation which 
regularises the position of appeals. 
A. Appeals from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal 
Before the Crimes Act 1961 came into force, there was no 
right of appeal in respect of criminal contempts. It was different 
in the case of civil contempts. These came within the general 
appeal provision in the Judicature Act 1908. (l) 
The English Criminal Appeal Act 1907 and the New Zealand 
Criminal Appeal Act 1945 both provided a right of appeal when 
an offender was convicted upon indictment. As has already been 
seen, this procedure is no longer used in the case of contempts. 
The only other possible provision that could be invoked to 
provide a right of appeal was section 66 of the Judicature Act 1908 
and its predecessor, section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 1882. 
In England, no appeal could lie to the Court of Appeal (as opposed 
· . 1 1 ( 2 ) ) . . . 1 tt ( 3 ) to the Court of Cr1m1na Appea in any cr1m1na cause or ma er. 
(1) Section 66 - any judgment, decree or order 
(2) Now the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. See 
Criminal Appeal Act 1966 (U.K.) section 1(6) (a) 
(3) See Barrie & Lowe 287; Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 section 3(1) (a); also O'Shea v O'Shea & Parnell exp. 
Tuohy (1890) 15 P.D. 59 
In 1900 the Court of Appeal held in Ex parte Bouvy (no. 3) (l) that 
the equivalent of section 66 did not confer jurisdiction in 
criminal matters(
2
) and this would include criminal contempt cases. 
Section 384 of the Crimes Act 1961 now provides an appeal from 
the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal. It was moulded on 
section 9 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1954. ( 3 ) Section 384(1) 
provides a right of appeal against sentence when a criminal 
contempt in the face of the court is cormnitted. This is subject 
to the proviso that there is no appeal against a sentence of 
detention until the rising of the court. Section 384(2) deals 
with the situation where the contempt is not a contempt in the 
face of the court. Here the offender may appeal both against the 
finding of guilt and the sentence. 
This section is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
there is the problem whether a particular act amounts to a criminal or 
civil contempt. This matter has already received detailed 
consideration. (4 ) As we will later see, the English appeal 
provisions do not suffer from this defect as there is now a 
( 5) uniform procedure in all cases of contempt. 
The next area of criticism relates to the provisions of 
sub-section (1). When the contempt is committed in the face of 
the court, a person is restricted to appealing against sentence. 
It is difficult to visualise the reason for the distinction. It is 
submitted that the need for a full appeal is even greater as the 
judge in this situation is essentially a judge in his own cause. 
(1) (1900) 18 N.Z.L.R. 608 
(2) cf. Stagpoole v Brewer (1894) 13 N.Z.L.R. 136 
(3) Adams. Para. 3362 cf. McKeon v Queen (1971) 16 D.L.R. (3ed.) 
390 (S.C.C.) 
(4) Part VI ante 
(5) Administration of Justice Act 1960 (U.K.) section 13(1) 
r 
The writer has been unable to discover the reason for introducing 
this restrictive provision into New Zealand law. 
The third problem associated with the section is the question 
whether there is an appeal from proceedings under sections 351, 
352, 375 and 401 of the Crimes Act and sections S6A - 56C of the 
Judicature Act. 
Adams(l) is of the opinion that sentences imposed under 
section 401 of the Crimes Act (and presumably section 56C of the 
Judicature Act) are appealable. In the case of conduct proscribed 
by paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of both sections, it 
has earlier been submitted that such conduct amounts to contempt 
in the face of the court. (2 ) If this view is correct, then there 
can be no appeal against the finding of guilt under these 
paragraphs. The same question also arises in relation to 
paragraph (c). Adams( 3 ) assumes that there are some acts 
punishable under the two sections which do not amount to contempts 
in the face of the court. The writer has also previously expressed 
the view that in the case of section 401 breach of an order 
(punishable under paragraph (c)) would be a contempt in the face of 
the court. ( 4 ) Breach of an order in civil trials when section 56C 
is invoked would either be a criminal contempt in the face of the 
court or a civil contempt which would be appealable under section 66 
of the Judicature Act and not under section 384 of the Crimes Act. 
(1) Para. 3365 
(2) Part IIA(2) (a) ante 
(3) Para. 3365 
(4) Part IIA(2) (a) ante; see also Mihaka v Queen: Decision of O'Regan J. Judgment 26.3.1975. His Honour in dealing with a similar section in the Summary Proceedings Act (section 206) 
said:-
"The various matters referred to in section 206 of the 
Summary Proceedings Act are all contempts in the face of 
the court ... " 
This would tend to support the writer's interpretation of section 
401 of the Crimes Act. 
It is, therefore, submitted that Adams is incorrect in the view 
that there can be an appeal under section 384 against a finding 
of guilt in accordance with section 401. The same conclusion 
follows in the case of a finding of guilt under section 56C of 
the Judicature Act except to the extent that paragraph (c) 
of sub-section (1) relates to civil contempts. 
Section 351 of the Crimes Act and section 56A of the 
Judicature Act deal with an area also covered by the law of contempt, (l) 
but they provide an alternative procedure and do not affect the 
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The sections do not purport 
to be statutory modifications of the contempt jurisdiction nor are 
they expressed as 'statutory' contempts. Consequently, we may 
conclude that orders made under these sections cannot be appealed 
against under section 384. 
Section 352 of the Crimes Act and section 56B of the Judicature 
Act provide more difficulty. While the sections provide a procedure 
which is quite different from that exercised under the inherent 
jurisdiction(l) the presence of sub-section (3) in both sections 
must be accounted for. Adams considers that the effect of sub-section 
(3) is to prevent the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to the 
extent that the section applies. If this were to be so, it gives 
weight to the arguement that sections 352 and 56B are statutory 
contempt provisions( 3 ) and, thus, orders made under them are 
appealable by virtue of section 384. The matter remains in doubt. 
(1) See Part IIA(2) (c) ante 
(2) See Part IIA(2) (b) ante 
(3) Sections 352 and 56C must be regarded as contempts in the 
face of the court if they are contempt sections at all. 
Accordingly, only an appeal against sentence would be 
available. 
It is lastly necessary to deal with the question of appeals 
from proceedings taken under section 375 of the Crimes Act, 
section 84(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings Act and section 15(2) 
of the Evidence Act. In all these sections the prohibited 
behaviour is to be punished "as contempt of court." By this 
means the law relating to the punishment of contempt of court is 
incorporated into the sections. Consequently, there can be no 
doubt that there is an appeal under section 384 of the Crimes Act. 
In England special provision is made. Section 13 ( 5) (a) of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1960 makes it clear that orders or 
decisions under any enactment enabling a court to deal with an 
offence "as if it were contempt of court" may be appealed against. 
B. Appeals from the Court of Appeal to the Privy Council 
Once an appeal in contempt proceedings has been determined 
by the Court of Appeal an appeal to the Privy Council is possible 
under both the 1920 and 1957 Orders in Council. Rule 1 of the 
1920 Rules and Rule 1 in the Schedule to the 1957 Rules both define 
'judgment' as including any 'decree, order, sentence or decision'. 
It is submitted that a decision by the Court of Appeal in a contempt 
matter comes within this definition. The practical difficulty 
is that there is no appeal as of right in either the case of a 
criminal or civil contempt as Rule 2(a) of the 1910 Order in Council 
only refers to civil proceedings where "the matter in dispute amounts 
to or is of the value of five hundred pounds sterling." (l) 
(1) The amount should read "five thousand New Zealand dollars" 
if clause 3 of the New Zealand (Appeals to the Privy Council) 
(Amendment) Order 1972 (S.I. 1972/1994) is valid. cf. The 
Privy Council (Judicial Committee) Rules Notice 1973 (S.I. 1973/ 
181) 
An appellant must, therefore, obtain the leave of the Court of 
Appeal under Rule 2tb) or (c) of the 1910 Rules of the leave of 
the Privy Council under Rule 2 in the Schedule to the 1957 Order 
in Council. Furthernore, in criMinal cases the Privy Council 
is reluctant to give leave to appeal and this would apply to 
contempt proceedings. (l) 
C. Appeals from the Magistrates' Court to the Supreme Court 
Appeals from the exercise of the Magistrates' Court 
criminal jurisdiction are governed by Part IV of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957. Section 107 (appeal on a question of law 
by way of case stated) applies only to a situation where an 
information or complaint has been determined. Likewise, 
section 115 (general right of appeal) only applies when there 
has been a determination of an information or a complaint. 
Section 206 of the Summary Proceedings Act and section 112 
of the Magistrates' Court Act do not require the above 
procedures to be followed in the exercise of the contempt 
jurisdiction conferred thereby, but rather provide a special 
procedure of their own based upon the equivalent sections in the 
English County Courts Acts. This lead Adams(
2 ) to conclude 
that there can be no appeal from proceedings taken under 
section 206 or section 112. This view has also been taken in a 
recent decision in the Supreme Court. In Mihaka v Queen(
3 ) 
(1) See Sims Practice & Procedure (11th Ed.) Vol. 2 p.893 
Also Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad & Tobago 
(1936) A.C. 322 
( 2 ) Par a . 3 3 6 4 
(3) Unreported judgment - 2b.3.75 
O'Regan J. decided that there was no jurisdiction for the 
Supreme Court to entertain an appeal from an order made by a 
magistrate under section 206 of the Summary Proceedings Act. 
His Honour had reserved the matter for consideration because:-
"I entertained doubt that Parliament would have left such 
a summary power - involving personally, as it so often does, 
the Magistrate or Justice empowered to make the order -
not subject to review by this court." 
After pointing out that the right of appeal conferred by 
section 115 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 arises only upon 
the determination of an information or a complaint he went on:-
"This, in the nature of things, precludes an appeal against 
a committal for contempt in as much as such is not initiated 
by information or complaint but on the summary order of the 
Magistrate or Justice. Counsel did not refer me to - nor 
have I myself found any provision - in the Summary Proceedings 
Act itself or in any other enactment conferring a right of 
appeal against such an order." 
O'Regan J. mentioned the existence of appeal rights from the 
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeal and found difficulty to 
ascribe a reason for this difference. He thought that legislation 
was needed to provide for appeals from the Magistrates' Court. 
The writer would add that His Honour's recommendations should also 
apply to section 112 of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
Under section 20(5) of the Summary Proceedings Act a witness 
is liable on summary conviction for non attendance. Presumably, 
a prosecution under section 20(5) would be commenced by complaint 
in which case an appeal could lie. However, in the case of 
section 39 of the Summary Proceedings Act and section 18 and 
( 
C 
54(1) (a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act it is submitted that as 
the procedure is not by information or complaint no appeal would 
lie from an order nade under them. 
It is now necessary to turn to the Appeal provisions in 
Part V of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1947. Section 71 provides 
a right of appeal to "any party to any proceeding in a Magistrate's 
Court." 'Proceedings' are defined as including both 'actions' 
and 'matters'. 'Matter' is in turn defined as 'every proceeding 
in a court which may be commenced ... otherwise than by plaint.' 
The question that arises out of these definitions is whether 
'proceeding' includes the exercise of a Magistrates' Court 
contempt jurisdiction. We nay confidently concentrate solely on 
the courts' jurisdiction to commit for civil contempt as 
section 2(2) of the Summary Proceedings Act provides that except 
as expressly provided in the Act, nothing in the Act shall be 
deemed to relate to any court in respect of the exercise of the 
criminal jurisdiction referred to in the Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957 and every reference to a court shall be deemed to relate 
to a court in which civil proceedings may be taken. Thus, a 
reference to the Magistrates' Court in section ,1 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act must be restricted to a court exercising 
civil jurisdiction. 
Section 79(1) of the Act specifically provides that a 
judgment or order for the payment of a sum of money may be 
enforced by any one or more of the proceedings mentioned in that 
sub-section. It is suggested that it is reasonable to regard 
'proceedings' here as having the same meaning as it does in 
section 2(2) of the Act. Section 79(2) does not refer to the 
procedure by way of order or warrant for committal as a 'proceeding' 
but it is submitted that an application for a warrant of committal (l) 
is a proceeding within the meaning of section 2(2). This view 
is supported by the fact that section 79(5) provides that 
the 'proceedings' shall be commenced for the enforcement of a 
judgment or order until the expiry of forty eight hours from the 
time of the entering of the judgment or the making of the order. 
'Proceedings' in sub-section (5) nust refer to proceedings under 
sub-sections (1) and (2). 
In conclusion, it may be said that although there is no 
appeal in cases of criminal contempt, there is in those cases of 
civil contempt falling within section 79. The new section 71A 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act( 2 ) does not alter this situation 
as it merely provides for appeals against interlocutory orders 
as if they were final orders. The lack of an appeal in criminal 
contempt cases is to a small extent mitigated by the Supreme 
Court's review powers, which were formerly exercised upon 
application for the issue of the prerogative writs but which now 
are covered in the case of 'statutory powers of decision' by the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The Supreme Court will only be 
able to interfere if there was no evidence upon which the 
Magistrate could have proceeded or if the form of the warrant was 
incorrect. ( 3 ) 
D. The English Reforms 
Until 1960 the English law relating to appeals in contempt 
(1) See Rule 262 of the Magistrates' Court Rules 1948 
(2) As inserted by the Magistrates' Courts Amendment Act 1974 
(1974/20) 
(3) R. v Staffordshire County Court Judge (1888) 57 L.J.Q.B. 483 
See also Wily Magistrates' Court Practice and Tenancy 
Legislation (7th Ed. 1973) p.210; Adams Para. 3607 
proceedings could have been largely equated with the situation 
here. Then, with the coming into force of the Crimes Act 1961 
the law was changed to provide for appeals from the Supreme Court 
as previously described. In the interim, section 13 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1960 furnished a comprehensive 
provision dealing with appeals from all courts and tribunals. 
Section 13(1) enacts that an appeal lies from any order or 
decision of a court in the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction 
and that the provisions of section 13 are to have effect in 
substitution for any other enactment relating to appeals in civil 
or criminal proceedings. 
Subsection (2) deals with the courts to whom appeals lie from 
the various courts mentioned in the subsection, and need not 
concern us further. Subsection (3) gives the appellate court 
power to reverse or vay any order or decision made in the court 
below and the subsection further authorises the making of rules 
of court providing for release or bail of an appellant. 
Subsection (4) is a special provision concerned with appeals to the 
House of Lords. 
Subsection (5) deems the word 'court' to include any tribunal 
or person having power to punish for contempt and provides a 
reference in the section to an order or decision of a court in the 
exercise of contempt jurisdiction and includes a reference:-
(1) to an order or decision of the High Court or a County Court 
under any enactment enabling that court to deal with an 
offence as if it were contempt of court; 
(2) to an order or decision of a county court or of any court 
having the powers of a county court under section 30(l) 
(1) cf. section 18 Magistrates' Courts Act 1947 
section 127{l) or section 157( 2 ) of the County Courts 
Act 19~9; 
(3) to any order or decision of a Magistrates' Court under 
sub-section (3) of section 54( 3 ) of the Magistrates' Courts 
Act 1952. 
Also included are sections 74 (equivalent of section 79 
of our Magistrates' Courts Act) and section 1~5 (power to enforce 
solicitors' undertakings) of the County Courts Act 1959 to the 
extent that these sections confer contempt jurisdiction. 
A proviso similar to section 13(5) of the Administration 
of Justice Act 1960 would remove the difficulties experienced 
at present in determining whether an appeal lies in any 
particular situation against the statutory jurisdiction conferred 
by the Judicature Act 1908, Crimes Act 1961, Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957, Evidence Act 1908, Magistrates' Courts Act 1947, 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1963 and others. The problem is 
expecially crucial in the case of the Magistrates' Courts 
where the jurisdiction is completely statutory. In this regard, 
it may be noted that section 13(5) of the Administration of Justice 
Act 1960 expressly covers the situation of an appeal against an 
order made under the provisions in the County Courts Act 1959, 
which are the equivalent of section 18, 79 and 112 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act and section 206 of the Summary Proceedings Act. In 
New Zealand it would be necessary to add to the list of sections 
included by mention of section 39 of the Summary Proceedings 
Act and section 54(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 
(1) This section concerns rescuing goods seized under an execution 
(2) cf. Section 112 Magistrates' Courts Act 1947 and Section 206 Summary Proceedings Act 1957 
(3) This sub-section provides for the enforcement of orders of a Magistrates' Court by fine or committal 
There is little dispute that sone reform is necessary 
in this field. The exact form that it should take still 
has to be resolved. In England, the problem was dealt with 
in connection with other contempt reforms. In New Zealand 
it may be a considerable time before any comprehensive 
reform is undertaken, and as O'Regan pointed out in 
R. v Mihaka (l) there is a present need for remedial 
legislation in the area of appeals. 
(1) Unreported judgment: 26.3.75 
PART IX 
CONCLUSION 
A large number of possible areas of reform have now been 
traversed. The need for reform is perhaps more pressing than 
previously because of the increasing importance of contempt law. 
Recently, there has been an upsurge in the number of contempt 
proceedings being brought in New Zealand courts. Two cases already 
decided this year have shown up difficulties and inadequacies in the 
jurisdiction and procedure of the courts in contempt cases. {l) 
It would be unrealistic to expect an examination of the law upon 
the scale of the Phillimore Committee{ 2 ) but the writer believes that 
reform in the procedural field is obtainable in many respects without 
the necessity of setting up a body similar to the English Committee. 
Dr. Finlay earlier this year was reported as saying that the pending 
review of the law of defamation may be extended to include a 
consideration of the law of contempt. The outcome of this is 
awaited with interest. 
(1) Attorney-General v Taylor et al. (1975) 2 N.Z.L.R. (S.C.) 
Judgment on appeal 11.7.1975 
( 2 ) Cmnd . 5 7 9 4 
APPENDIX 1. 
401. Contempt of Court-( 1) If any person-
(a) Ass,1Ults, threatens, intimicbtes, or wilfully insults a 
Judge, or any Registrar, or any officer of the Court, 
or any juror, or any witnes.s, during his sitting or 
attendance in Court, or in going to or returning 
from the Court; or 
(b) \Vilf ully interrupts or obstructs the proceedings of the 
Court or otherwise misbehaves in Court; or 
( c) \Vilf ully and without lawful excuse disobeys any order 
or direction of the Court in the course of the hearing 
of any proceedings-
any constable or officer of the Court, with or without the 
assistance of any other person, may, by order of the Judge, 
take the ofTender into custody and detain him until the rising 
of the Court. 
(2) In any such case as aforesaid, the Judge, if he thinks 
fit, may sentence the orTcnder to imprisonment for any period 
not exceeding three months, or sentence him to pay a fine not 
exceeding one h1111drecl pounds for every such offence; and in 
default of payment of any such fine may direct that the 
offender be imprisoned for any period not exceeding three 
months, unless the fine is sooner paid. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect any power 
or authority of the Court to punish any person for contempt 
of Court in any case to which this section does not apply. 
Contempt of Court 
56c. Conlempt of Court-( I) If any person-
(a) Assaults, threatens, intimidates, or wilfully insults a Judge, or 
any Registrar, or any officer of the Court, or any juror, or 
any witness, during his sitting or attendance in Court, or in 
going to or returning from the Court; or 
(b) Wilfully interrupts or obstructs the proceeding, of the Court 
or otherwise misbehaves in Court; or 
(c) Wilfully and without lawful excuse disobeys any order or direction 
of the Court in the course of the hearing of any proceedings--
any constable or officer of the Court, with or without the assistance 
of any other person, may, by order of the Judge, take the offender into 
custody and detain him until the rising of the Court. 
(2) In any such case as aforesaid, the Judge, if he thinks fit, may 
sentence the off ender to imprisonment for any period not exceeding 
three months, or sentence him to pay a fine not exceeding one hundred 
pounds for every such offence; and in default of payment of any such 
fi~e may direct that the offender be imprisoned for any period not 
exceeding three months, unless the fine is sooner paid. 
(3) ~othing in this section shall limit or affc:ct any power or ~uthor-
ity of the Court to punish any person for contempt of Court in any 
case to which this section docs oot apply. 
·' ~' : ~; ./ . _,-:.;\ : . 
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